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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of acquirer-target social connections along with the target 52-week 
high (Baker, Pan, & Wurgler, 2012) on acquisition premiums. We show that acquisition premium is 
more sensitive to first-degree connection than the reference point, suggesting that information is the 
main driving force for determining acquisition premiums. The findings also indicate that connected 
directors are more likely to favour the firms where they hold higher positions and negotiate 
favourable premium. Acquires pay lower premiums when target directors are retained in the new 
entity. Connected acquirers are also more likely to finance their deals with equity. Overall, this 
paper provides support to the information flow hypothesis that acquirers with social connections 
have better access to target information and enhanced bargaining power in negotiations.  
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1. Introduction 
Social network studies have attracted considerable interest from researchers. A growing 
body of literature has introduced the social network theory into M&A studies and explored 
the impact of social connection on takeover outcomes. These studies emphasize the social 
ties between acquirers and targets but find mixed results in terms of the effects of social 
connection.  On the one hand, acquirers with a social connection would benefit from the 
information advantage and be better able to determine the target’s true value, therefore 
enhancing their bargaining power in negotiation and paying a lower premium for the target 
(Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Mol, 2001; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Schoorman, Bazerman, & Atkin, 
1981). On the other hand, social connection could raise issues  (Ishii & Xuan, 2014), such 
as overtrust, familiarity bias1(Cao et al., 2009), social conformity2  (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004) and overconfidence of acquirer management (Roll, 1986), therefore increasing the 
likelihood of overpayment and leading to inefficient and unprofitable transactions.  
Motivated by the conflicting results, we re-examine the social linkage between acquirers 
and targets and provide further evidence for the role of social connection in the takeover 
process. Specifically, this study concentrates on the relationship between acquirer-target 
connection and acquisition premium3 by incorporating the target’s 52-week reference point.  
Previous studies indicate that a premium is not only an important measurement for the 
market to evaluate takeover transactions for bidders and targets but also strongly influences 
merging firms’ financial situations and post-acquisition performance in the short and even 
the long term (Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, & Travlos, 2013; Alexandridis, Mavrovitis, & 
Travlos, 2012; Ayers, Lefanowicz, & Robinson, 2003; Holmén, Nivorozhkin, & Rana, 
2014; Schwert, 1996). More importantly, acquisition premium is directly and largely 
affected by the acquirer-target connection among the indicators for takeover outcomes since 
the premium best reflects the information advantage and bargaining power in the 
 
1 Familiarity bias describes the observation that individuals prefer familiar choices or decisions, while avoiding any changes from the 
status quo (Cao, Han, Hirshleifer, & Zhang, 2009). 
2 Social conformity refers to the bias that individuals are likely to follow the opinions of their peers instead of pursuing their own 
personal beliefs (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). This leads to inefficient negotiations between acquirer and target, in which the respective 
shareholders’ interest is not properly represented. 
3 Premium is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from the target's share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement (Baker et al., 2012). 
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negotiations between acquirers and their targets. Hence, analysing premiums could better 
verify the information hypothesis of social network studies. 
This paper introduces a psychological reference point (Baker et al., 2012) to examine what 
plays a determining role in target valuation and bid premium. According to Baker et al. 
(2012), acquisition partners are highly affected by the anchoring effect in pricing targets 
and negotiating premium. 52-week high price represents the recent peak price that firm 
achieved in the past 52 weeks (Baker et al., 2012). 52-week high is easily obtained and 
widely cited as firm valuation in the financial media and management report. Both 
acquirers and targets regard a target’s 52-week high4 as a psychological reference point for 
target valuation and rely heavily on this psychological anchor when negotiating their offer 
premium. A higher target 52-week high implies a higher bid premium. Such a significant 
and positive relationship has been widely confirmed by recent studies (Alexandridis et al., 
2013; Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, & Thorburn, 2014). By involving the reference point 
theory (Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework, this study sets a more 
appropriate research framework to investigate whether acquisition premium is more 
affected by the acquirer’s social network or a psychological anchor. In this paper, we adopt 
two types of cross-firm connections based on the BoardEx database: first-degree and 
second-degree connections. A first-degree connection refers to a situation in which a board 
director or executive serves on both acquiring and target firm boards prior to the deal 
announcement, while a second-degree connection5 happens when two individuals, 
respectively from the acquirer and target firm, have social ties through past experience 
(such as employment history or educational background). First-degree connection links 
bidders with targets via the same individual director while second-degree connection 
involves two directors and connects merging parties via the third firm. Therefore, first-
degree connection is more direct and closer relation between acquirers and targets than 
second-degree connection. Hence, information obtained through first-degree connection is 
more comprehensive and accurate, resulting in more precise valuation. Moreover, first-
 
4 The target 52-week high is defined as the target’s highest stock price over the period from 365 days before to 30 days before the 
takeover announcement, denoted as the log percentage difference of the target stock price 30 days before the takeover announcement 
(Baker et al., 2012). 
5 BoardEx considers different relationship types. Possible routes are classified as follows: Quoted, Non-Quoted, Not for Profit, Education 
and Others. The latter contains connections that cannot be distinguished in any other allocations, for instance military service. Thus, such 
a connection could be non-professional or, rather, not business related. 
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degree connections could better smooth the information exchange and communication 
between the merging parties, leading to larger bargaining power and stronger impact in the 
negotiation of premium. 
We empirically test the impact of social connection by using a sample of 1,502 US M&A 
deals between 2001 and 2016, out of which 15.18% of all transactions are connected either 
by first- or second-degree connections. We find that the existence of social connection 
reduces premium by 6.53% relative to non-connected transactions. Especially in first-
degree connected deals, acquiring firms pay on average 11.33% less premium than that paid 
in takeovers with no connection. The findings provide evidence that bidders could benefit 
from social connection by being better able to estimate targets’ true value and improve their 
own bargaining power, therefore paying lower acquisition premiums. In particular, this 
information advantage is strengthened for bidders with a first-degree connection, since 
acquirers would have better communication during negotiation, helping them secure a 
much lower and more favourable offer premium. 
We further control for the reference point – target 52-week high – in the premium analysis. 
According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is positively related with bid 
premium. We divide the full sample into three groups based on the target 52-week 
reference point. Compared with the premiums paid in the non-connected deals, connected 
acquirers pay 2.94% less within the group of low target 52-week reference point and 10.61% 
less within the group of high 52-week reference point. This indicates that connected 
acquirers are less affected by the target’s 52-week reference point. The greater influence of 
first-degree connection than reference point is supported by the multivariate analysis. In 
particular, we observe that first-degree connections are negatively related to premiums, 
while we find no significant relation between target 52-week reference point and premiums 
after controlling for year and industry fixed effects. The results indicate that first-degree 
connection has stronger effect than target reference point in deciding the amount of 
premium. The findings indicate that connected acquirer bargaining power is substantially 
increased, such that merging firms ignore the reference point when valuing the target 
during negotiation. Therefore, information advantage is the main determinant for the 
acquisition premium in deals with a first-degree connection, rather than the reference point. 
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For robustness reasons, we reclassify the social connections into CEO connection, in which 
either the acquirer or target CEOs connect the two merging firms. Based on this definition, 
CEO connections are subdivided into CEO first-degree connections and CEO second-
degree connections. We find that CEO connections, especially first-degree CEO 
connections, significantly reduces the premium paid by acquirers. The finding can be 
attributed to more accurate information provided by target CEOs and their powerful role in 
decision-making. 
In addition, we explore incentives of why connected directors favour acquirers over targets. 
We find that acquirers pay lower premium when retaining the directors who link acquirers 
and targets together. In first-degree connected deals, the retention of connected directors 
leads to significantly lower premium (13.17%). Acquirers offer directorship of combined 
firms for all the interlocking directors. In second-degree connected deals, acquirers which 
retain connected directors pay 6.26% lower premium than firms which offer no board seats.  
These connected directors obtain more benefit and power from acquiring firms, therefore 
serving on acquirer’s interest and resulting in lower premium. In addition, acquisitions 
(48.48%) in which connected directors hold equivalent level position in both the bidder and 
the target firm are associated with average 28.20% premium, significantly lower than 46.94% 
premium in the deals that director hold higher position in targets. Therefore, connected 
directors have self-incentive to assist towards the completion of takeover deals and remain 
in the combined firm. In deals with second-degree connection, acquirers that recruit 
connected target directors in the new board are more likely to pay lower premium since a 
board seat in combined firm is secured. Hence, target connected directors have strong self-
incentive to accelerate the acquisition process and compromise on lower acquisition 
premium, resulting in deviation from target shareholders’ interest.  
Finally, we examine the impact of connections on the medium of payment in mergers and 
acquisitions. Bidders in connected transactions are prone to finance acquisition with their 
overvalued stock. Due to information asymmetry, targets’ shareholders run the risk of 
accepting bidders’ overvalued equity. Connections between bidders and targets can increase 
trust and information flow and therefore targets’ shareholders can better value bidder stock 
leading to a higher likelihood of equity payments. 
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 We contribute to the current literature in several ways. First, we add to the existing body of 
literature by taking into account the social ties between acquirers and targets. We provide 
evidence that the measurement of target value not only depends on the firm’s previous 
stock, operating and financial situation, but is also largely affected by the invisible social 
relations between acquirers and targets. In addition to Cai and Sevilir (2012) who provide 
similar evidence, we introduce the target 52-week high as a reference point to the existing 
framework. To our knowledge, we are the first to incorporate reference point theory(Baker 
et al., 2012) in premium analysis. According to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-week high is 
an important reference point for both acquirers and targets to price the target during 
negotiation. On the one hand, we verify the positive relation between target 52-week high 
and acquisition premium. On the other hand, we find that in first-degree connected deals, 
acquisition premium is not affected by the target 52-week high and is substantially 
decreased by the existence of a first-degree connection. That is, information advantage in 
first-degree connections significantly enhances acquirers’ bargaining power and generates a 
much greater influence on the offer premium than reference point. Information is the main 
determinant of acquisition premium, rather than target 52-week high. We verify the 
information hypothesis in cross-firm connections, while previous studies draw ambivalent 
conclusions regarding the impact of social connections on takeover activities. 
Another contribution relates to the method of payment. Few studies consider the impact of 
social connection on the choice of takeover timing and payment method. In addition to 
Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) theoretical explanation of why targets 
accept bidders’ overvalued equity, we show that the close bidder-target relationship plays 
an important role in explaining this fact. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) use a UK sample and 
demonstrate that connected deals are more likely to be paid with stocks, attributed to the 
board effect. We employ a US sample and enrich the view by analysing the pre-
announcement stock performance of both acquirers and targets.  
We further contribute to the studies on corporate governance and directorship. Unlike 
Renneboog and Zhao (2014) who find that target directors that are connected with bidder 
directors are more likely to be invited to participate in the new board, we show that this has 
a further impact on determining acquisitions premium. We provide new evidence that first 
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degree connected director offer lower premium if they hold more senior positions in the 
acquiring firms. In second degree connected deals, lower premium is offered to target firms 
if the target director is retained in the new board of the merged entity.  We support previous 
findings (Harford, 2003; Wang, Sakr, Ning, & Davidson, 2010) that target directors would 
take priority of self-interest and compromise on acquisition premium at the cost of targets’ 
shareholders’ interests in order to obtain directorship in combined firms.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 
presents the development of our hypotheses. In section 4 we describe our data and 
methodological approach. Section 5 connects our empirical results with our hypotheses and 
draws the first interpretation of our results. Finally, section 6 concludes and summarises our 
research. 
2. Literature review 
The main characteristic of social ties is that connection enables the flow of resources 
through a given network of individuals (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Information is among 
the most important resources in the business world, since individuals and companies suffer 
from information asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In other words, it is the fact that one 
entity has more information than another.  
Recent studies on social network indicate that social connections has both a positive and a 
negative impact in corporate performance and investment decisions. A considerable number 
of studies confirm the existence of information advantage in social networks. For example, 
Uzzi (1999) suggests that firms that are socially linked with middle-market banking have a 
lower cost of capital than those without a social connection. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 
(2012) find that commercial banks deliver more favourable financing terms to connected 
firms due to the improved information and monitoring arising from that connection, 
including a lower interest rate, higher credit ratings and better stock performance. Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) address the board connection between acquiring firms and target firms and 
investigate its impact on acquisition performance. The findings show that social connection 
significantly increases the announcement return for acquirers and the combined entity. 
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Moreover, bidders with a first-degree connection pay a lower acquisition premium and 
transaction cost, measured by total investment bank fees. Second-degree connection 
improves the operating performance of combined firms in the long run. The results confirm 
the information advantage hypothesis in M&A studies. However, Cai and Sevilir (2012) do 
not explain why connections between bidders and targets only benefit bidding firms. One 
therefore asks if only acquirers benefit from board connections, why are target firms willing 
to accept less favourable deal items. 
However, Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that social connection has a negative effect on 
takeover activities due to issues of over-trust, familiarity bias and social conformity. Social 
connection via an individual network builds trust beyond single business transactions and 
has a longer duration. Yet, over-trust leads to inefficient decision-making, resulting in 
inferior firm performance. Additionally, management (senior executives or directors) may 
over-trust the information they obtain through their personal network and overestimate the 
information quality as well as their power of control. Therefore, social connection may lead 
to the CEO hubris problem (Roll, 1986) and therefore negatively affect deal outcomes. 
Moreover, social connection may raise the issue of familiarity bias, which refers to the 
situation where individuals prefer to maintain the status quo and select familiar firms in 
terms of their investment decisions. Therefore, firm management with social connections 
may give priority to familiar partners and neglect better business opportunities beyond their 
individual networks, therefore resulting in less favourable investment decisions. Another 
issue raised in social connections is social conformity, which implies that individuals prefer 
to follow the decisions of the group rather than put forward their personal opinions 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Similarly, social conformity may lead to inefficient decision-
making and poor firm performance.  
3. Hypotheses Development 
In this section we develop our hypotheses based on the main theory of social networks, 
psychological reference point theory and M&A studies. 
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According to Baker et al. (2012), both acquiring and target firms regard the target 52-week 
high as a reference for the premium paid or received in the negotiation. In general, the 
settlement of takeover deal should be approved by target shareholders, management and 
bidding firms. For the majority of target shareholders, calculating firm valuation is a 
complex and time-consuming task, which requires many information and accurate forecast 
of targets. Therefore, target shareholders would search for easily available benchmark for 
pricing target. The target 52-week high is the recent peak price that target firm achieved 
before takeover announcement and may be attained or exceeded in the future. Target 52-
week high is easily obtained and widely cited in the financial media, and therefore can be 
used as a reference point for target valuation. For target management, using target 52-week 
high price as a negotiation anchor would save time and effort to estimate firm valuation and 
communicate with shareholders.  For acquiring firms, information shortage makes it more 
difficult to value and negotiate with target firms. Therefore, acquirers would anchor target 
recent peak price in order to settle the M&A transaction. 
However, social connection could alter the target valuation and negotiation for acquisition 
partners. The presence of inter-firm connection facilitates information transfer and 
exchange via individual networks and therefore reduces the information asymmetry 
between firms (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In M&A deals, social connection, especially first-
degree connection, brings large information advantage to acquiring firm. Connected 
acquirers have better access (Mol, 2001) to the target’s information, which is more detailed, 
accurate and current information than the target 52-week high6 to value the target firm. If 
information is the main driver of lower premiums paid to target firms, closely connected 
bidders should pay lower premiums. Moreover, bidder-acquirer connection greatly 
improves the acquirers’ bargaining power (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Schoorman et al., 1981) 
and weakens the effect of target reference point on premium. Therefore, we hypothesise 
that  
H1: After controlling for the 52-week high reference point, first-degree connected bidders 
pay lower premiums than non-connected bidders. 
 
6 By definition, 52-week high is the peak price that target reached at least 1 month before acquisition. Target valuation at 
takeover announcement may derive from the peak price. Therefore, target value estimated on the basis of peak price 
(target 52-week high) may not be accurate. 
11 
 
Baker et al. (2012) introduce the psychological phenomenon of “anchoring-and-adjustment” 
to explain the process of target pricing. “Anchoring-and-adjustment” suggest that 
individuals would select a preliminary estimate as anchor (reference point), and then adjust 
towards the final decision or true value (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). In mergers and acquisition, the peak price that targets achieved in the 
last 52 weeks is regarded as the anchor or reference point of target valuation. Acquirers 
would base offer price on the reference point and make subsequent adjustment according to 
information and negotiation. Acquirer-target connection, especially first-degree connection, 
reduces the information asymmetry and improves the bargaining power in the negotiation. 
Therefore, the existence of social connection positively affects the adjustment of bidding 
premium. 
 
According to Baker et al. (2012), by anchoring high reference points (peak price of target 
firms), bidders are more likely to pay higher premium and are more likely to derivate from 
target true value. However, lower target 52-week high represents smaller difference 
between peak price in last 52 weeks and recent share price. Anchoring low quantile of 
target 52-week high for premium is associated with low premium. In the adjustment 
process, acquirers would revise offer price towards the true value of target firms. Acquirers 
with first-degree connection have better access to target true value and better bargaining 
power in the negotiation, and therefore pay reasonable lower offer price in the deals with 
higher target reference point. The adjustment in the first-degree connected deals is larger 
and more sufficient when target reference point is high. It is in this regime that the 
anchoring behavioural bias is more pronounced and the information advantage emanating 
from connections helps bidders adjust their valuation accordingly and pay relatively lower 
premium. The adjustment effect of close connection is lower in the low quantile of 
reference point as the anchoring effect is less pronounced. The additional information 
brought by connection may have less influence in reducing the amount of premium. 
Therefore we expected that: 
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H2: The lower premiums paid by connected bidders should be more pronounced when the 
target 52-week reference point is high. 
 
Previous literature indicates that overlapping directors facilitate the information transferring 
and smooth the communication between connected firms (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). However, the contribution of resources and experience is highly 
affected by the organization identification (Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2006; 
Shropshire, 2010). Organizational identification, a concept in management studies, refers to 
how employees identify or understand the firms and therefore affect the employees’ 
contribution to the work. The directors who hold positions on multiple boards have stronger 
organizational identification in the firms where they work as CEO/ Chairman. Therefore, 
interlocking directors would favour the firms and contribute more advice as well as 
knowledge to the organization where they serve as CEOs/Chairman and have stronger 
organizational identification. Moreover, the position of CEO/chairman could bring more 
financial and non-financial benefit as well as power to the interlocking CEOs. Hence, 
interlocking directors would act in the interest of firms where they hold higher and more 
important positions. Therefore, we expect that 
H3: Connected directors/ executives are more likely to favour the firms where they hold 
higher position and negotiate favourable premium.  
 
Target directors are more likely to accept lower premium in exchange of directorship in the 
newly merged firms (Wang et al., 2010). Board seats in newly merged firms would signal 
the high quality and expertise of directors and bring more job opportunities, resources and 
network to the director (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Harford, 2003; Wang et al., 2010). 
Therefore, target directors may sacrifice shareholders’ interest and compromise on 
premium in order to retain in the new board. Moreover, if acquirers and targets are 
successfully merged, target firms may not exist in the future. Retained directors who 
previously work in targets are responsible to represent the interest of “future” shareholders 
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in the combined firms. Hence, target directors with higher likelihood to be retained are 
more likely to approve the deal with lower premium. 
Furthermore, acquiring firms are willing to retain the connected target directors (or senior 
executives) in the newly merged firms. Previous literatures find that firms are willing to 
bring a “friend” or “someone they know” into the business due to the familiarity effects 
(Chen, Levy, Martin, & Shalev, 2014; Cooney, Madureira, Singh, & Yang, 2015). To 
maintain the long-term relationship, “friends” may take into account the interest of their 
partners (Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & 
Lu, 2007). Moreover, target directors (or senior executives) who are linked with acquiring 
firms via personal network, have better acknowledgement of targets and acquirers and 
therefore could accelerate the post-merger integration process (Li & Aguilera, 2008). 
Therefore, acquirers tend to retain the target directors who have social connection with 
them. In overall, we expect that  
H4: Acquirers pay lower premium when connected target directors/executives are retained 
in the newly merged firms.  
 
 CEOs play a more powerful and essential role over boards (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; L. 
A. Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Daily & Schwenk, 1996; El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 
2015; Finkelstein, 1992; Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015). L. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
propose a managerial power theory and indicate that CEOs dominate boards and have more 
bargain power in the negotiations, especially in CEO compensation maters. The dominant 
role of managerial power could be attributed to the fact that board directors lack the 
incentives to serve shareholders’ interest. On the one hand, the selection of board members 
may be affected or controlled by CEOs (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Rosenstein, 1987; 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). On the other hand, directors may compromise in exchange of 
financial benefit and business opportunities provided by CEOs. Moreover, directors would 
avoid conflicts with CEOs due to the social and physiological reasons, such as collegiality 
and friendship (L. Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). 
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CEOs have more accurate information than boards and are responsible for day-to-day 
operation and management activities. CEOs have superior information of their firm’s state 
of operation and financial situation (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). Boards serve in 
advising and monitoring management and corporate performance. Directors are not directly 
involved in daily operations (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Board directors make decisions based 
on the information provided by management and at times information transfers 
insufficiently between CEOs and board. 
Therefore, connection with CEOs is more valuable and efficient than connection with 
boards. Acquirers linked with target CEOs have greater information advantage and suffer 
less resistant from target firms. Acquirer CEOs who also sit in the target board would 
favour acquirers and negotiate lower premium because they are offered more reward in 
bidding firms. Hence, we expect that: 
H5: Acquirers with CEO connection, especially CEO first-degree connection, pay lower 
premiums than acquirers with board connection. 
Chemmanur, Paeglis, and Simonyan (2009) examine public takeover deals and find that 
acquirers are more likely to use cash deal when facing greater extent of two-sided 
information asymmetry. Social connection, especially first-degree connection, reduces the 
information asymmetry and improves bargaining power of acquirers during negotiation and 
therefore increses the likelihood of stock payments. The probability of deal completion 
affects acquirers’ choice of payment method. Cash offer may signal the high valuation of 
targets and therefore could deter the potential rivals of bidding firms, leading to higher 
probability of successful deals. For public acquirers, the prevention of competing bid 
outweighs the expected cost in information asymmetry. Connected acquirers have better 
access to target information and therefore better acknowledge the intrinsic value, 
operational and financial situation of target firms, as well as the bidder itself. Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) indicate that acquirers who are linked with targets are less likely to be 
involved in completing bid. Therefore, acquirers are more likely to use stock to pay the deal 
in socially connected deals. 
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Generally, in stock offers, targets are uncertain of acquirers’ true stock valuation. Equity 
payment implies the overvaluation of bidding firms (Chang, 1998; Huang & Walkling, 
1987; Martynova & Renneboog, 2009; Travlos, 1987). Target would only accept equity 
payment when the stock offer exceeds the true value of target firms. Hence, acquirers take 
longer time to negotiate and complete deals when the payment involves with partly or 
entirely stocks (Golubov, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2012). Acquirer-target connection increases 
the trust and bargaining power between two parties. Targets in socially connected deals 
have better access to valuation of bidders’ stock, therefore increase the likelihood of 
accepting equity payments. Moreover, in stock offer, targets’ board of directors could 
exchange the shares of target firms for the shares of bidding and increase their voting power 
in the newly merged firms (Ghosh & Ruland, 1998). Therefore, targets’ board would favour 
stock payment if they desire to continue their influence in the new board. Additionally, 
targets board may face tax obligation when the deal is paid with cash (Travlos, 1987; 
Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 1983). Connected directors which previously worked in the target 
have higher likely to retain in the combined firms due to the familiarity effects (Chen et al., 
2014; Cooney et al., 2015). Therefore, connected target directors tend to discourage the 
cash offer due to personal interest. Therefore, we expect that: 
H6: Acquirers in connected deals are more likely to finance acquisitions with stock. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. Data and selection criteria 
The data for our analysis is gathered from different sources. We collect US takeover deal 
information over the period from 1st January 2001 to 31st December 2016 from the 
Thomson One database. The timeframe was selected to match the growing data availability 
of BoardEx, which started in 1999.7 The original sample contains140,418 deals. Because of 
the availability of information, we focus only on public transactions where both acquirer 
 
7 The BoardEx database is widely used when analysing social connections in the business context. Other studies using BoardEx include 
Engelberg et al. (2012) and Ishii and Xuan (2014). However, both studies automatically retrieve the data. We, on the other hand, 
manually check every cross-firm connection.  
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and target are quoted, leaving 4,750observations. Moreover, we only include deals of at 
least $10 million, resulting in 3,809 deals. We only consider takeovers with a transfer of 
control. Specifically, we select transactions in which the acquirer obtained more than 50% 
ownership of the target, leaving 2,528 takeover bids. We drop another 1,026 observations 
where information is not available in the COMPUSTA and CRSP databases. Finally, we 
obtain a full sample of 1,502 M&A deals. 
For the identification of social connections between acquirer and target companies we 
access relationship data from BoardEx. These data were collected and linked manually 
using the Point-to-Point8 tool for each M&A deal. If more than one company was listed 
with the same or a similar name, we hand-checked and compared the data by utilising our 
previously computed market values to identify the appropriate company. The classification 
of social connections is based on the BoardEx. Connection includes both first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection classifies a CEO or 
board member9 that forms part of both the acquirer’s and the target’s board at the time of 
the deal announcement. A second-degree connection represents a social tie at board level 
between two individuals respectively from the acquirer and target firms. For second-degree 
connections we allow any possible connection between two peers, including employment 
history and education background. 
We split the full sample into two subgroups: 228 deals with a social connection and 1274 
deals with no connection. We categorise the connected deals into 66 first-degree connected 
deals, where a first-degree connection exists between merging firms, and 162 second-
degree connected deals, in which only second-degree connected transactions are included.  
Furthermore, we reclassify the socially connected deals into 106 CEO-connected deals, in 
which either acquirer CEOs or target CEOs link the bidding and target firms, and 122 
board-connected deals, in which an acquirer board member is the connection between 
merging firms. Specifically, CEO-connected deals include 45 first-degree CEO-connected 
deals, where the CEO in the bidding or target firm serves as an executive, and 61 second-
degree CEO-connected deals, in which acquirer or target CEOs share the same past 
 
8 BoardEx’s Point-to-Point tool allows us to manually control for connections between two companies. It has the advantage that we can 
personally select the companies’ names.  
9 Herein, board member does not include CEO. 
17 
experience with board members or executives in other merging firms. Likewise, deals with 
board connection consist of 21 first-degree board-connected deals, in which acquirer board 
members also serve on the target’s board, and 114 second-degree board-connected deals, in 
which acquirer board members have social ties with target board members through past 
experience. 
4.2. The sample 
The sample consists of 1,502 M&A deals. Table 1 illustrates the number of M&A deals by 
year and industry of the acquirers. We classify deals into two main groups for our research, 
namely connected and non-connected deals. The connected subsample represents all M&A 
deals where we successfully identified a first- or second-degree connection. Otherwise, the 
deal is specified as non-connected. In general, the large number of M&A deals is 
distributed over the period from 2003 to 2006 and from 2014 to 2016, during which sixth 
(Alexandridis et al., 2012) and seventh merger waves10 (Mavis et al., 2016) occur. Starting 
from 2014, the number and value of M&A transactions substantially increase in the U.S 
market. The high proportion of connected deals falls within 2013 to 2016. The connected 
deals announced in 2013 to 2016 mainly occurred in the finance industry and business 
equipment industry.  
The industry classification is based on the acquirer’s industry, according to the Fama-
French 12-industry classification. It is evident that Finance, and Business Equipment 
companies initiate most of the deals, together representing 58.39 % of our entire sample. 
This pattern is also evident for our connected deals, where both industries account for  
48.25 % of all connected deals. Further, we observe that some industries only contain a few 
connected deals, for instance Consumer Durables or Consumer Non-Durables. To control 
for this inequality we employ industry fixed effects in our multivariate analysis. 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for firm and deal characteristics. An explicit 
 
10 Following Harford (2003),  Mavis, McNamee, Petmezas, and Travlos (2016) identify the emergence seventh merger 
wave in banking, healthcare, real estate and trading etc. industries over the period from 2011 to 2013.  
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definition and the source of collection for each reported variable is reported in Appendix A. 
Additionally, we conduct the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to analyse whether the differences 
between our sub-groups are statically significant. In general, we observe significant 
differences between connected and non-connected deals. The acquirers in connected deals 
have  higher Tobin’s Q, higher market values (MV) and greater returns on assets (ROA), 
implying that those companies have higher market valuation and outperform their peers in 
terms of profitability. Interestingly, we observe that connected targets have higher market 
value but lower Tobin’s Q. In general, acquirers have higher Tobin’s Q than targets, 
implying that acquirers are relatively overvalued than targets (Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, & Teoh, 2006). The difference of Tobin’s11 is larger between acquirers and 
targets in deals where merging parties are socially linked, which implies that the extent of 
misevaluation is more salient in connected deals.  
Due to the larger size of connected target firms, connected deals are substantially higher in 
terms of transaction value and relative deal size. All connected deals together represent 
25.15% of the total transaction value of our sample. Interestingly, the average premium 
paid for connected targets is significantly lower (by 6.53 %) compared to non-connected 
targets while we do not observe striking difference of target 52-week reference point 
between connected and non-connected deals. This is the first evidence supporting our first 
hypothesis, which states that connected bidders pay less premium regardless of reference 
point. In addition, we find that connected deals are more frequently paid completely with 
stocks. The acquirers’ run up, an indicator of overvaluation, is higher in connected deals, 
implying that connected acquirers are likely to time their acquisitions and proceed when 
their stock is overvalued. According to Travlos (1987) and Dong et al. (2006), acquirers 
tend to pay target firms with overvalued stocks. This could explain the lower acquisition 
premium in connected deals, since connected acquirers might finance transactions with 
overvalued stocks. Therefore, we need to control for the method of payment in our 
multivariate analysis.  
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
11 In socially connected deals, acquirers have on average 4.05 Tobin’s q and targets’ Q ratio is 2.69 where in non-
connected deals, the average Tobin’s Q of acquirers and targets are 3.12 and 2.80, respectively.   
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Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of all variables in this study. As expected, we observe 
the strong correlation between premium and first-degree connection as well as target 
reference point (Baker et al., 2012). In line with Officer (2003), premium are positively 
associated with cash payment and negatively related with stock payment. Premiums are 
significantly increased in tender offers and deals involved with multiple bidding firms 
(Edmister & Walkling, 1985; Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004; Officer, 2003). 
Furthermore, socially connected deals are more likely to be financed with acquirers’ equity. 
Larger-sized bidders tend to select stocks as medium of payment. Additionally, positive 
relation is observed between stock payment and transaction value. 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The Impact of Social Connections and Target 52-week Reference Point on Acquisition 
Premiums 
5.1.1. Target 52-week high and acquisition premium 
In this section, we test the reliability of target 52-week high in affecting offer premium. 
Following Baker et al. (2012), we employ target peak price over various horizons (13 
weeks, 26 weeks, 39 weeks and 104 weeks prior to date announced) as alternative target 
levels. Similar to target 52-week high, X-week high is calculated as the log percentage 
difference of the target's X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the 
M&A deal announcement. Next, we use histograms to plot the density of the difference 
between offer price and target reference points (target 13-week high, 26-week high, 39-
week high, 52-week high and 104-week highs), following Baker et al. (2012). The red 
curve in each histogram below plots the normal distribution of the difference between offer 
premium and various target reference points. Except target 52-week high (histogram D), the 
average mean of normal distribution derives from zero. However, the offer premium 
centers on the target 52-week high, implying that target 52-week high is more accurate and 
reliable to gauge offer premium than other alternative target reference points. For that 
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reason, we employ the 52-week as the main reference point for the analysis of the paper. 
[Insert Figure1 About Here] 
 
5.1.2. Univariate analysis 
In this section, we undertake the univariate analysis and examine whether the relation 
between social connection and premium would be affected by the value of target reference 
points. Table 4 reports average premium paid in deals classified by target 52-week high and 
social connection. Specifically, we divide the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, 
high), depending on the degree of log percentage difference between the 52-week high 
share price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. The high 
quantile represents a large gap between the target recent price (four weeks before 
announcement) and peak price during the past 52 weeks. According to reference point 
theory (Baker et al., 2012), acquiring firms in high quantile would negotiate the offer price 
by anchoring higher target reference points and therefore tend to pay higher premium while 
bidders in the low quantile are expected to pay lower premium. We further split the full 
sample into the non-connected deals sample and the connected deals sample (including 
first-degree and second-degree connected deals), and perform with two-tailed t-test to 
examine the difference in premium between pair-wise groups. 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
In Table 4, we observe that the acquisition premium increases progressively from the low 
quantile to the high quantile, which supports the findings in Baker et al. (2012). For each 
quantile, connected deals have lower average premium than non-connected deals. The 
difference of average premium between connected deals (Column 2) and non-connected 
deals (Column 5) is -7.39% in the medium quantile and -10.61% in the high quantile, both 
significantly different from zero at 5% level. However, we observe no significant difference 
in the low quantile. The findings support hypothesis 2, which indicates that the social 
connection effect in premium is more pronounced when target 52-week high price is high.  
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the premium paid in the highly connected deals (first-degree 
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connection Column 3) is significantly less than the premium in non-connected deals 
(Column 5) in all quantiles of the target 52-week high. Moreover, acquirers pay lower 
premium in first-degree connected deals (Column 3) than in deals with second-degree 
connection. The results above imply that the inter-firm connection reduces the acquisition 
premium. The closer connection between acquirers and targets has more negative impact 
since acquirers gain larger information advantage in first-degree connected deals. 
 Overall, the univariate analysis provides preliminary results and suggests that premium is 
negatively affected by social connection. The negative effect of social connection does not 
seem to be affected by the target’s 52-week high reference point.  
5.1.3. Multivariate analysis 
We further proceed with multivariate premium analysis to test the robustness of the 
previous finding. In Table 5, we regress acquisition premium against connection dummy 
variables (including variables for connection, first-degree connection and second-degree 
connection) which equal one if the acquirers and targets are socially connected, and zero 
otherwise. Moreover, we introduce the target 52-week high as a reference point to gauge 
the anchoring effect in negotiation of premium. Following Baker et al. (2012), we compute 
the log percentage difference of targets’ 52-week high and target price four weeks before 
the announcement. We also include common variables of firm and deal characteristics in 
previous M&A studies, such as the Tobin’s Q (Officer, 2003; Schwert, 2000) relative size 
of deal (Moeller et al., 2004), payment method, deal attitude (Schwert, 2000), and whether 
the bid involves multiple bidders (Walkling & Edmister, 1985). Additionally, we control 
both year and industry fixed effects in all models. 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
In the model 1 and model 2, social connection, especially first-degree connection, is 
significantly negatively associated with acquisition premium, suggesting that social linkage 
between merger parties could significantly reduce premium. In particular, the coefficient 
for first-degree connection is -0.4072 in Model 2, significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. The finding demonstrates that the existence of a first-degree connection reduces the 
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acquisition premium. However, the relation between second-degree connection and 
premium is insignificant in all models. These findings are in accordance with Cai and 
Sevilir (2012), who suggest the targets in higher-connection deals obtain lower premiums. 
The results can be explained by the greater information advantage associated with first-
degree connections. Having a close connection with a target means that acquirers benefit 
from more accurate target information and enhance their bargaining power in the 
negotiation process. 
Consistent with Baker et al. (2012), we observe that target 52-week high reference point is 
positively associated with the acquisition premium in model 3. The findings confirm that 
higher target 52-week highs results in higher acquisition premiums paid to targets. The 
strong negative relation between premiums and connections, especially for first-degree 
connections, remains robust after controlling for the target 52-week high in models 4 and 5. 
The coefficients of target 52-week high become insignificant in Model 4 and Model 5 with 
fixed effects included. The connection variables reduce the coefficient and significant level 
of target 52-week high from significance (0.0386 significant at 1% in Model 3) to 
insignificance (0.0145 in Model 4; 0.212 in Model 5). The findings support our hypothesis 
and indicate that social connection has stronger explanatory power than target reference 
point in premium analysis.  The findings could be attributed to the information advantage in 
the connection, especially in first-degree connections. The target reference point is public 
information for acquirers; therefore it reflects limited target information. A first-degree 
connection largely reduces the information asymmetry between acquirers and targets, 
resulting in acquirers better comprehending a target’s true value and having enhanced 
bargaining power in negotiations. Therefore in connected deals, acquirers obtain more 
information about target valuation and could rely less on 52-week high to negotiate 
acquisition premium. Therefore, social connection, especially first-degree connection, 
outweighs the target reference point and plays a determining role in deciding premium. 
 
Moreover, the increase in relative deal size decreases acquisition premium12, in line with 
Alexandridis et al. (2013). Premiums are higher in transactions financed with cash, tender 
 
12 The negative relation could be attributed to lower competition for large takeover transactions(Gorton, Kahl, & Rosen, 2009), leading to 
less pronounced “winner’s curse” (Alexandridis, Petmezas, & Travlos, 2010) and lower probability of overpayment to targets 
(Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
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offers (Schwert, 2000) or deals with lower target Tobin’s Q ratios (Bargeron, Schlingemann, 
Stulz, & Zutter, 2008). 
 
To further disentangle the effect between connections and the target 52-week reference 
point, in Table 6 we further split the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium, high) 
according to the target 52-week reference points. We analyse the relation between 
acquisition premium and social connection in the subsample of Low/High target 52-week 
high. In Model 1 and Model 2, the dependent variable is the connection variable. In Model 
3 and Model 4, acquisition premium is regressed against first-degree and second-degree 
connection.  
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
Generally, the relation between premium and connection, especially first-degree connection, 
is more negative and significant in the subsample of high target 52-week highs than in the 
group with low target 52-week highs. In Model 4, the coefficient for first-degree connection 
is -0.3937 in the high quantile, significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient in the low 
quantile is -0.5089 and statistically insignificant. As expected in second hypothesis, first-
degree connection has more pronounced effects in the deals with higher target 52-week 
high reference points. Higher target 52-week high13 represents larger gap between peak 
price and recent price of target firms. Compared with low target 52-week high, high 52-
week high is more likely to derivate from target true value, resulting in higher premium 
paid. However, acquirers with social connection, particular first-degree connection, could 
estimate firm value more accurately and negotiate reasonable price due to the information 
advantage. Therefore, the negative impact of connection, particularly first-degree 
connection, is more pronounced and stronger in deals with a high reference point. 
5.2 Why director favour acquirer and why target accept lower premium? 
The findings presented so far indicate acquiring firms take over connected targets by paying 
lower premium, especially when acquirers’ and targets’ board share the same directors. 
 
13 Following Baker et al. (2012), Target 52-week high is computed as the log percentage difference between 52-week high price, the 
recent peak price that target firms achieved, and target price at 4 weeks before the takeover announcement. 
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According to the agency theory, directors are recruited to represent shareholders’ interests 
and act as a monitoring device. While directors are in general influenced by the target52-
week high, in socially connected deals, managers are no so much influenced by the 
reference point and accept significantly lower acquisition premium. In this section, we 
explore why directors are more likely to favour the acquirer and why target boards are 
willing to be acquired with low offer premium and try to explain the incentive from the 
seniority and retention of connected directors. 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
5.2.1 Seniority impact in premium 
In Table 7, we provide the univariate and multivariate evidence on the seniority and 
retention of connected directors and investigate its impact on premium. We first examine 
the positions of connected directors in acquisition partners and classify interlocking 
directors’14 board positions both in the acquirer and target firm (or connected directors in 
the second-degree connected deals, respectively from acquirers and targets) into the 
following categories: CEO, Chairman, independent director or common director. According 
to the importance and influence in corporate decisions, we define two levels of importance. 
The first level includes the CEO and Chairman roles while the second level refers to the 
common director and independent director. Higher level positions for acquirers (targets) 
indicate that the interlocking director holds a more important position in the acquirer (target) 
than in the target (acquirer) respectively while the same level position indicates that 
directors serve as the same level position in both acquisition partners. In our sample, 14.91% 
of connected directors hold higher positions and have more power in acquiring firms than 
in targets, 66.67% of connected directors have same level board position in acquirers and 
targets. In first-degree connected deals, 33.33% of interlocking directors hold more 
important positions in acquirers while 48.48% of interlocking directors are in the same 
level positions.  
Panel A lists the premium in transactions classified by the seniority of connected directors. 
 
14 In the first-degree connected deals, the board member who serve on both acquirers and targets are called “interlocking directors”. 
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Two-tailed t-test is employed to exam the difference of premium between pair-wise groups. 
In general, the acquirers pay significantly less premium when connected directors hold the 
same level or more important position in bidding firms, especially when acquires and 
targets share the same interlocking directors. In first-degree connected deals, the acquisition 
premium is on average 13.17% when the director holds a higher and more powerful 
position in acquirers while acquisition premium is 46.94% when directors hold a higher 
level board seat in the target, indicating that directors favor firms in which they dominate. 
Acquisition premium is on average 28.20% in takeover deals in which director act in the 
same level board position of acquisition partners, indicating that directors are prone to 
protecting acquirers’ interests. In panel C of Table 7, the first four models regress premium 
on the independent variables related to seniority15.  The coefficients of A_higher position 
are negative and statistically significant at 1% level, implying that premium would be 
largely reduced when connected directors hold higher position in acquirers. The results of 
mmultivariate analysis support the seniority hypothesis (hypothesis 3). The findings could 
be explained by that interlocking directors have stronger organizational identification in the 
firms where provide higher-level positions and therefore would contribute more important 
resources and valuable advices to the firms (Hillman et al., 2006; Shropshire, 2010). 
Therefore, interlocking directors who serve as CEO/ chairman in the acquirers would 
favour bidding firms and negotiate lower premium.  
5.2.2 Retention effect in premium 
Next, we investigate the retention of connected directors and its relation with premium.  In 
first-degree connected deals, we find that all interlocking directors who served in both the 
acquirer and the target firm continue to stay in the new board of combined firms after the 
acquisition, since interlocking directors have better acknowledgement and understanding in 
both acquirers and targets and therefore could facilitate and accelerate post-merger 
integration process (Li & Aguilera, 2008). In second-degree connected deals, target 
directors share same experience (education, employment, others) with acquirer directors. In 
general, few target directors could continue to serve in the new board after takeovers are 
 
15 A_higher position refers to the situation that connected directors hold higher level position in bidding firms while A_T same level 
position is that connected directors in acquirers serve in the same level positions with ones in target firms. 
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completed (Harford, 2003). However, in second-degree connected deals, 33.33% of target 
connected directors are retained in the board of the combined firm following takeover deals, 
implying that social connections with the acquirer’s board plays an essential role in 
affecting target directors’ staying or leaving.  
Panel B of Table 716 shows that acquirers which retain target connected directors pay lower 
acquisition premium (30.12%). In second-degree connected deals, retention of target 
directors would reduce on average 6.26% of premium. The findings are in line with 
retention hypothesis that bidding firms pay lower premium when retaining the connected 
target directors. The conclusion is further supported by Model 5 and Model 6 in Panel C of 
Table 7. We observe strong and negative relation between premium and the retention 
variable. The results can be explained by the fact that target directors may put their personal 
interests first as compared to the target firms’ shareholders.  
Harford (2003) document that target boards would resist takeover bid or charge high 
acquisition premium to compensate their financial, information, network loss due to the 
loss of directorship. However, directors may compromise and neglect target shareholders’ 
interest when self-interest are satisfied. Similarly, Wang et al. (2010) provide evidence that 
target directors sacrifice shareholder’s interest and accept lower acquisition premium in 
exchange of the directorship in combined firms. Moving to the board of combined firm 
would signal high quality and expertise of director, resulting in more job opportunities in 
labour market. For retained directors, accepting low acquisition premium can be regarded 
as protecting future shareholders’ interest. Additionally, the social linkage with acquirers 
would increase the likelihood of retention of target directors due to familiarity effects 
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2008; Cooney et al., 2015; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2007). 
Therefore, connected directors have more incentive to compromise on deal items in order to 
exchange board seat and favour the interest of future shareholders.   
Taken together, retaining connected directors are associated with low acquisition premium 
and confirm that connected board directors in target firms have strong self-incentive to 
 
16 In first-degree connected deals, all the interlocking directors are retained in the newly combined firms. Therefore, we do not show the 
univariate analysis of premium for first-degree connected deals. 
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complete acquisition even at the cost of shareholder’s interest.  
5.3. Alternative Proxy for Social Connection 
El-Khatib et al. (2015) adopt the CEO centrality17 to study the relation between acquisitions 
and within-firms social connection and indicate that takeover activities is strongly 
influenced by the CEO centrality. Therefore, we employ an alternative proxy related to 
CEO for connectedness between acquirers and targets as a robustness analysis for takeover 
premium. We reclassify the cross-firm connection into only CEO connections. Specifically, 
CEO connections refer to the instances when acquirer or target CEOs act as a go-between 
for bidding firms and targets. CEO connections are further split into CEO first-degree 
connections, in which the acquirer (target) CEO also works as a target (acquirer) board or 
management member. CEO connections are classified as second-degree if the acquirer or 
target CEO shares the same past experience with board members or executives in the 
counterpart. 
Table 8 reports the relation between acquisition premium and CEO connection, including 
first-degree and second-degree connection. We also introduce the reference point – target 
52-week high – in Model 2 and Model 4. In Model 5 and Model 6, we split the full sample 
into three quantiles (low, medium, high) and analyse the impact of CEO connection on 
acquisition premium in the subsample of low/high target 52-week highs. We control both 
year and industry fixed effects in all models18. 
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
We observe that the coefficient for CEO connection is -0.3117, significant at 5%, while the 
coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.5075, significant at 1% with target 52-
week high controlled. The findings support the hypothesis of CEO connection and suggest 
that acquisition premium is strikingly reduced by CEO connection, especially first-degree 
connection. In Model 5 and 6, we find that the coefficients for the CEO connection variable 
 
17 CEOs with higher centrality negatively affect the acquisition performance. The CEO centrality qualifies the strength and importance of 
CEO within the top managements in the aspect of performance, decision-making and dedication. The higher CEO centrality implies that 
CEO plays a more essential and powerful role within organization. 
18 We also test all models without year and industry effects and find the same results; the results remain robust. 
28 
are more significant when the takeover deals are in the high quantile of target 52-week high. 
The coefficient for CEO first-degree connection is -0.8295 (insignificant) in the subsample 
of low target 52-week highs, while the coefficient is -1.0470 (significant at 1%) in the 
subsample of high target 52-week highs. The results reveal that CEO connection, especially 
first-degree, is more pronounced in the high reference point subsample. This indicates that 
CEOs with connections, especially first-degree connections, are not anchored by the 
target’s reference point and indeed pay lower premiums. 
5.4. Method of Payment 
Previous findings indicate that acquirers could benefit from social connection and their 
resulting higher information advantage they have, by paying lower premiums to targets. In 
this section, we further explore whether bidders could exploit this information advantage 
and the close relationships they have with target firms in other aspects. We investigate 
whether social connection would have an effect on the method of payment.  
[Insert Table 9 About Here] 
In Table 9, we employ the logit regressions to address the relation between social 
connection and medium of payment. The dependent variable is a stock dummy, which is 
equal to one if the deals are fully paid with stock. The explanatory variable includes 
connection (in Model 1 and Model 2), first-degree connection and second-degree 
connection (in Model 3 and Model 4). The models also include the other control variables, 
year fixed effect and industry fixed effect. 
 In general, all the models show striking relations between the medium of payment and 
variables representing connection. The coefficients for connection are positive and salient 
in Model 1 and Model 2, implying that bidders in connected deals are prone to finance bids 
with their own stock. In Model 4 with fixed effects controlled, stock deals are positively 
associated with first- and second-degree connections, significant at 1% level. Moreover, the 
coefficients for first-degree connection (0.8662 in Model 4) are greater than those for 
second-degree (0.7159 in Model 4), indicating that a closer connection has a bigger impact 
on the choice of payment medium. Therefore, acquirers with a first-degree connection tend 
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to choose stock to pay for takeover activities. The findings are consistent with our 
hypothesis. 
Acquirers may choose equity as payment method due to ownership structure and contingent 
effects. In stock offer, target shareholders are concerned with overvaluation of acquirers 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2009; Travlos, 1987). Bidding firms taker longer time to 
negotiate and complete transaction paid with stock (Golubov et al., 2012). Social 
connection between acquirers and targets, especially first-degree connection, reduces the 
two-sided information asymmetry, increases the trust and enables the target shareholders to 
accurately value bidders’ stocks. Therefore, targets are more likely to accept equity 
payment in socially connected deals. Moreover, target board or management would accept 
stock offer in exchange of shares and voting power of combined firms. Connection with 
acquirers increases the likelihood of retention, therefore leading to higher probability of 
acceptance of stock payment.  
5.5 Robustness check 
5.5.1 Endogeneity test  
In this section, we employ the two-stage-least-square (2SLS) procedure to address possible 
endogeneity problems concerning bid premium. We select instrumental variables (IVs) that 
relate to the key connection variables but do not directly influence the error component in 
the models. The objective is to avoid correlation between independent variables and the 
residuals in OLS regressions. Specifically, the instrument is whether a social connection 
existed between acquirers and targets three years before the announcement. Since an M&A 
deal is usually not prepared three years in advance, the connection built 3 years before does 
not serve the purpose of acquisitions. Therefore, we expect that this instrumental variable 
has no impact on our dependent variables (acquisition premium), but to directly affect the 
connection variables. 
[Insert Table 10 About Here] 
We consider connections three years before the announcement as the instrumental variable 
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for connection in previous OLS regressions, first-degree connection three years before for 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection three years before for second-degree 
connection. Table 10 shows both the first and second stages for the endogeneity test. 
Following Politis and Romano (1994), we apply the resampling technique — stationary 
bootstrap to estimate standard errors and confidence intervals in order to address potential 
issue of stationary and weakly dependent observations. The observations in the block of 
random length, where the length of each block is distributed with a geometric distribution 
with mean b. We control year and industry fixed effects in all models. In Model 2 and 
Model 4, we also include target 52-week high. The endogeneity results lead to similar 
conclusions as previous sections. We still find a negative impact of social connection, 
especially first-degree connection, on acquisition premium. The coefficient for first-degree 
connection is negative and statistically significant at 1%, even with target 52-week high 
controlled in Model 4. Moreover, we proceed with the Hausman test to further check the 
endogeneity when the independent variable is connection (any connection), first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that 
the connection variable is exogenous. The p-value of the Hausman test is 0.5401 when 
connection (any connection) is the regressor, while the p-value is 0.2581 when first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection are as independent variables. Therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that connection variables are exogenous.   
5.5.2 Alternative indicators for reference points 
In order to fully compare the impact of social connection with psychological anchoring 
effect, we also include target peak price over various horizons as alternative indicators for 
target reference points.  Following Baker et al. (2012), we adopt target 13-week high, 26-
week high, 39-week high and 104-week high as alternative reference points. Similar to 
target 52-week high, X-week high is calculated as the log percentage difference of the 
target's X-week high share price over the share price four weeks before the M&A deal 
announcement. 
[Insert Table 11 About Here] 
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Table 11 represents the multivariate analysis with alternative reference points. We divide 
the full sample into three quantiles (low, medium and high) based on various target 
reference points and then test the relation between connection and premium in the 
subsample of low/ high target reference point. We observe that first-degree connection 
exert a strong and negative effect on offer premium in the high quantile of alternative 
reference points while no significant relation is found in low quantile. The findings are 
consistent with the results with target 52-week high as reference point (Table 5) and 
confirm that the negative effect of first-degree connection is more pronounced in the high 
quantile of reference points. By anchoring high reference points (peak price of target firms), 
bidders are more likely to pay higher premium and are more likely to derivate from target 
true value. Acquirers with first-degree connection have better access to target true value 
and better bargaining power in the negotiation, therefore pay reasonable lower offer price, 
especially in the deals with higher target reference point. Combining the premium analysis 
together, the evidence shows that connection plays a determining role in pricing target 
firms and negotiate premium.  
 
5.5.3 Propensity score matching 
In this section, we employ propensity score matching (PSM) method to reduce the potential 
selection bias. Propensity score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) is a statistic method 
to estimate the treatment effects19 and reduce bias in non-randomized observational study. 
In PSM, the treatment group is matched with the control group which is not assigned to the 
certain condition but has similar characteristics and similar values of propensity score as 
treatment group. Herein, we adopt the propensity score matching (PSM) to evaluate the 
connection effect in premium. The treatment group is the sample of connected deals or 
deals with first-degree connection, while the control group (untreated group or comparison 
group) is the group of deals with no social ties but with similar corporate fundamentals and 
deal characteristics. Specifically, we adopt Nearest Neighbor (NN) matching as matching 
 
19 Treatment effects refer to the effect of a particular condition, such as policy, smoke, education etc. Treatment group is the group which 
is assigned the condition.  
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algorithm20 to obtain the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) (Imbens, 2004). 
ATT compares the outcome between treated and untreated units in the matched sample. In 
this paper, the ATT measures the difference of premium between connected deals and 
comparable non-connected sample which have similar values of propensity score.  
[Insert Table 12 About Here] 
Table 12 shows the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for connected deals and 
comparison groups. Moreover, we apply the bootstrap method to estimate the standard error 
and confidence interval.  In Panel 1a and Panel 1b, the treatment group is the deals in which 
acquirers are socially tied with targets. The control group in Panel 1a and Panel 1b is group 
of matched non-connected deals with similar firm deal characteristics. The difference 
between Panel 1a and Panel 1b is whether to include the target reference point in the 
baseline characteristics.  The Panel 2a and Panel 2b show the impact of first-degree 
connection on acquisition premium. Likewise, we consider the target reference point – 
target 52-week high as one of covariate variables to calculate the propensity score for 
control group in Panel 2b. Panel 1a shows the premium in treatment group is 20.3% less 
(significant at 10% level) than the premium in the control group while the premium 
difference is insignificant in Panel 1b.  In Panel 2a and Panel 2b, ATT is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level. The premium in treatment group is 15.3% significantly 
less than premium in comparison group in Panel 2a while difference of premium is larger, 
25.3% between treated and un-treated group in Panel 2b. The findings suggest that first-
degree connection exerts a strong and negative influence in premium even controlling 
target reference point as one of baseline characteristic. The results with propensity score 
matching further support our previous finding that connection, especially first-degree 
connection, largely reduces the acquisition premium. The negative effect of first-degree 
connection is not affected by the psychological reference points. 
 
 
20 As a robustness check, we also adopt the Stratifying matching and Kernel matching as matching algorithm to compute ATT and find 
similar results.   
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6. Conclusion 
With a US sample from 2001 to 2016, we focus on the influence of cross-firm social 
connections on acquisition premium during takeover activities. Our findings support the 
view that bidding firms with social connections with targets pay lower acquisition 
premiums. The savings in premiums would be larger when the two merging firms share the 
same board member or executives (that is, a first-degree social connection). To disentangle 
whether social connections are more related to better information flow or a familiarity bias, 
we introduce reference point theory (Baker et al., 2012) as an additional testing framework. 
Acquirers in first-degree connected deals would rely more on the information advantages to 
value the target, rather than the reference point – target 52-week high. Moreover, connected 
directors who are invited to participate in the new board of the new combined firm have 
stronger personal incentives to compromise on low acquisition premium at the cost of 
target shareholders’ interest.  After reclassifying social connection into CEO connection, 
we find that bid premiums are largely reduced when either target or acquirer CEO links the 
two merging firms. The results indicate that CEO connection is more efficient and valuable 
than board connection in affecting takeover activities. 
Further, favourable acquisition timing and payment method for acquirers could partially 
explain the negative relation between social connection and acquisition premium. We 
identify that acquirers in connected deals tend to take over targets when their own stocks 
are highly valued and the recent target price is far less than the target’s highest price over 
the previous year. Therefore, acquirers are prone to finance acquisitions with equity, due to 
overvalued stocks. 
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Figure 1: H
istogram
 of difference betw
een acquisition prem
ium
 and target reference point 
 Figure 1 presents the density of offer prem
ium
 relative to target reference point. Follow
ing Baker et al. (2012), w
e adopt peak price of target firm
s over different horizon (13 
w
eeks, 26 w
eeks, 39 w
eeks, 52 w
eeks and 104 w
eeks) X
-w
eek high is calculated as the log percentage difference of the target's X
-w
eek high share price over the share price 
four w
eeks before the M
&
A
 deal announcem
ent.  The acquisition prem
ium
 is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een offer price and the target’s share price four 
w
eeks before the deal announcem
ent. Each histogram
 plots the density of the difference betw
een prem
ium
 and target reference point. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 illustrates our complete sample of 1,502 US M&A deals by year and industry of the acquiring 
company. Industries are classified according to the Fama-French 12-industry categories. Hereby, we 
classify our sample by the acquirer’s SIC code. We consider deals where acquirer and target are quoted 
US American companies. The full sample is displayed first, followed by the classification of connected 
or non-connected deals. A connected deal can be based on a first- or second-degree connection. A non-
connected deal shows no evidence of any social connection. For each classification, we first report the 
number of deals per year followed by the number of deals per year by the total number of deals. This is 
done for each classification separately, and the ratio is reported as a percentage. 
 
Panel A: Deals per Year 
Full sample  Connected deals  Non-connected deals  Year  
Number  Percentage   Number  Percentage   Number  Percentage  
2001 144 9.59% 14 6.14% 130 10.20% 
2002 88 5.86% 11 4.82% 77 6.04% 
2003 124 8.26% 13 5.70% 111 8.71% 
2004 120 7.99% 8 3.51% 112 8.79% 
2005 102 6.79% 12 5.26% 90 7.06% 
2006 107 7.12% 9 3.95% 98 7.69% 
2007 93 6.19% 16 7.02% 77 6.04% 
2008 73 4.86% 10 4.39% 63 4.95% 
2009 63 4.19% 13 5.70% 50 3.92% 
2010 73 4.86% 9 3.95% 64 5.02% 
2011 46 3.06% 8 3.51% 38 2.98% 
2012 36 2.40% 3 1.32% 33 2.59% 
2013 97 6.46% 27 11.84% 70 5.49% 
2014 122 8.12% 23 10.09% 99 7.77% 
2015 141 9.39% 34 14.91% 107 8.40% 
2016 73 4.86% 18 7.89% 55 4.32% 
Total  1502 100.00% 228 100.00% 1274 100.00% 
       
Panel B: Deals per Industry 
Full sample  Connected deals  Non-connected deals  Fama-French industry 
classification (12) Number  Percentage   Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage  
Consumer NonDurables  40 2.66% 4 1.75% 36 2.83% 
Consumer Durables  14 0.93% 3 1.32% 11 0.86% 
Manufacturing  71 4.73% 16 7.02% 55 4.32% 
Energy, Oil, Gas and Coal 61 4.06% 16 7.02% 45 3.53% 
Chemicals  21 1.40% 6 2.63% 15 1.18% 
Business Equipment  361 24.03% 58 25.44% 303 23.78% 
Telephone and Television  40 2.66% 5 2.19% 35 2.75% 
Utilities  38 2.53% 16 7.02% 22 1.73% 
Wholesale and Retail  61 4.06% 9 3.95% 52 4.08% 
Healthcare and Med. Equip 180 11.98% 27 11.84% 153 12.01% 
Finance 516 34.35% 52 22.81% 464 36.42% 
Other 99 6.59% 16 7.02% 83 6.51% 
Total  1502 100.00% 228 100.00% 1274 100.00% 
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Table 2 – Sum
m
ary statistics 
 Table 2 reports the sum
m
ary statistics for our com
plete sam
ple of 1,502 U
S M
&
A
 transactions betw
een 2001 and 2016. W
e restrict the M
&
A
 deals by the follow
ing criteria: 
W
e only consider com
pleted M
&
A
 deals w
here both acquirer and target are quoted com
panies w
ith a deal value of at least $10 m
illion and w
here the acquirer obtained m
ore 
than 50%
 ow
nership of the target. Furtherm
ore, the data for both the acquirer and target com
panies need to be available from
 CRSP and CO
M
PU
STA
T. W
e break dow
n our 
variables into three panels: Panel A
 reports acquirer related firm
 characteristics, Panel B reports target related firm
 characteristics and Panel C reports com
m
on deal related 
characteristics. First, w
e present the values for the full sam
ple. N
ext, w
e sub-divide our sam
ple based on the presence and degree of social connections. For brevity, w
e 
include the CEO
 w
hen m
entioning the board of directors. A
 connection is present if at least one director from
 the acquiring firm
 has a first- or second-degree connection w
ith 
at least one of the directors from
 the target firm
. A
 first-degree connection, also know
n as board interlocks, is defined if a director serves sim
ultaneously on the acquirer’s and 
target’s boards at the announcem
ent of the M
&
A
 deal. A
 second-degree connection requires a social tie betw
een tw
o directors at the deal announcem
ent of acquirer and target, 
respectively. This connection m
ay be form
ed through any historical path, for instance em
ploym
ent, education or social clubs. The rem
aining deals are defined as non-
connected M
&
A
 transactions. A
ll denoted variables are specifically defined in A
ppendix A
. Tw
o-tailed t-test is em
ployed to exam
 the difference of variable betw
een 
connected and non-connected deals. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
  
Full sam
ple (І) 
Connected deals  (ΙΙ) 
U
nconnected deals (ΙΙΙ) 
(ΙΙ) - (ΙΙΙ) 
V
ariables 
M
ean  
Standard deviation 
M
ean  
Standard deviation  
M
ean  
Standard deviation  
D
ifference 
Panel A
: A
cquirer related  
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
Tobin's Q
  
3.2583 
11.5772 
4.0544 
12.0221 
3.1164 
11.4960 
0.9381** 
M
arket V
alue ($m
illions)  
19835.39 
45473.69 
23400.81 
46778.20 
19213.38 
45233.45 
4187.44*** 
Leverage  
0.3830 
0.2927 
0.3983 
0.2958 
0.3803 
0.2922 
0.0180  
Return on A
ssets (RO
A
) 
0.0256 
0.1571 
0.0377 
0.1069 
0.0235 
0.1645 
0.0143** 
A
cquirer run-up 
0.0973 
0.3524 
0.1622 
0.3960 
0.0888 
0.3441 
0.0734** 
Panel B: Target related  
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
Tobin's Q
  
2.7862 
9.2032 
2.6921 
5.9876 
2.8033 
9.6739 
-0.1112* 
M
arket V
alue ($m
illions)  
1664.18 
5069.07 
2848.98 
6467.88 
1454.79 
4752.40 
1394.20*** 
Leverage  
37.48%
 
1.1145 
36.89%
 
0.3382 
37.59%
 
1.2009 
-0.70%
 
Return on A
ssets (RO
A
) 
-0.0890 
1.4583 
-0.0233 
0.2091 
-0.1007996 
1.5813 
7.75%
* 
Target run-up 
0.1036 
1.6957 
0.0807 
0.5147 
0.1078 
1.8291 
-0.0271 
Panel C
: D
eal related 
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Transaction value ($m
illions)  
2,148.43 
6,328.85 
3,537.58 
8,139.58 
1,899.04 
5,915.28 
1638.55*** 
Prem
ium
 (%
) 
39.22%
 
0.3380 
33.68%
 
0.2910 
40.21%
 
0.3449 
-6.53%
*** 
Tim
e to resolution (in days) 
130.1262 
79.2904 
145.2061 
101.9994 
127.4189 
74.2111 
17.7872*** 
52-w
eek high (%
)  
63.44%
 
2.2929 
46.57%
 
0.9865 
66.42%
 
2.4516 
-19.85%
 
Relative deal size  
0.3333 
0.4692 
0.4153 
0.6166 
0.3213 
0.4373 
0.0940*** 
H
ostile takeover 
1.07%
 
0.0107 
0.88%
 
0.0935 
1.10%
 
0.1045 
-0.23%
 
Com
peting bid 
4.14%
 
0.1993 
4.39%
 
0.2052 
4.09%
 
0.1982 
0.29%
 
Pure cash deal  
39.45%
 
0.4889 
35.09%
 
0.4783 
40.24%
 
0.4906 
-5.15%
 
Pure stock deal  
24.49%
 
0.4302 
31.58%
 
0.4659 
23.20%
 
0.4223 
8.38%
*** 
D
iversification 
29.37%
 
0.4556 
27.19%
 
0.4459 
29.76%
 
0.4574 
-2.57%
 
Tender offer  
17.82%
 
0.3828 
18.86%
 
0.3920 
17.64%
 
0.3813 
1.22%
 
N
um
ber of observations 
1502 
228 
1274 
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Table 3 – C
orrelation m
atrix 
 Table 3 reports the correlation m
atrix and show
s the Pearson correlation coefficients for each pair of all variables in this study. A
ll denoted variables are specifically defined 
in A
ppendix A
. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
 C
orrelation M
atrix 
Prem
ium
 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
First-degree 
CEO
 
Connection 
Second-degree 
CEO
 Connection 
First-degree 
Board 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Board 
Connection 
Target 52-
w
eek high 
First-D
egree Connection 
-0.0947*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second-D
egree Connection 
-0.0146 
-0.0799*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First-degree CEO
 Connection 
-0.0916*** 
0.7511*** 
-0.0386 
 
 
 
 
 
Second-degree CEO
 
Connection 
-0.0504* 
0.0698*** 
0.4907*** 
-0.0354 
 
 
 
 
First-degree Board 
Connection 
-0.0440* 
0.7396*** 
-0.0480* 
0.3302*** 
0.1137*** 
 
 
 
Second-degree Board 
Connection 
0.0128 
-0.012 
0.8235*** 
0.0157 
0.0468* 
-0.0522** 
 
 
Target 52-w
eek high 
0.1190*** 
0.0069 
-0.0488* 
-0.001 
-0.0228 
0.0104 
-0.0331 
 
A
cquirer Tobin's Q
  
0.0231 
-0.0034 
0.0245 
-0.0031 
-0.0081 
-0.0066 
0.0304 
0.0145 
Target Tobin's Q
  
-0.0234 
0.0108 
-0.0092 
0.0012 
0.0029 
0.0128 
-0.0082 
0.0186 
Transaction V
alue 
-0.1433*** 
-0.0161 
0.2295*** 
-0.0232 
0.1379*** 
-0.0079 
0.1861*** 
-0.1546*** 
Relative D
eal Size 
-0.1493*** 
-0.0009 
0.0906*** 
0.0001 
0.0518* 
0.0112 
0.0634** 
0.006 
Pure Cash D
eal 
0.1590*** 
-0.0283 
-0.0462* 
-0.0292 
-0.0694*** 
-0.0287 
-0.0219 
-0.0483 
Pure Stock D
eal 
-0.1122*** 
0.0796*** 
0.0278 
0.0927*** 
0.1103*** 
0.0529** 
-0.0026 
0.1024*** 
H
ostile 
0.0521* 
0.0114 
-0.0211 
-0.017 
0.0089 
0.0261 
-0.0128 
0.0231 
Tender 
0.1523*** 
0.0188 
0.0003 
0.0005 
-0.0333 
0.0294 
0.0259 
0.0647** 
Com
peting Bid 
0.0566** 
-0.0089 
0.0088 
-0.0129 
0.0037 
-0.0107 
0.0093 
0.0147 
D
iversification 
0.0076 
0.0154 
-0.0329 
0.0326 
-0.0261 
0.0136 
-0.0135 
-0.0254 
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 C
orrelation M
atrix 
A
cquirer 
Tobin's Q
  
A
cquirer 
Run-up 
Target 
Tobin's Q
  
Transaction 
V
alue 
Relative 
D
eal Size 
Pure Cash 
D
eal 
Pure Stock 
D
eal 
H
ostile 
Tender 
Com
peting 
Bid 
Target Tobin's Q
  
0.0376 
-0.0063 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transaction V
alue 
0.0578** 
0.0464 
0.1016*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relative D
eal Size 
-0.0183 
0.0170 
-0.0202 
0.2478*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pure Cash D
eal 
0.0356 
-0.0863*** 
0.0287 
-0.0698*** 
-0.2967*** 
 
 
 
 
 
Pure Stock D
eal 
0.0011 
0.0814***  
-0.0217 
-0.0998*** 
0.0992*** 
-0.4597*** 
 
 
 
 
H
ostile 
-0.0076 
-0.0174 
-0.0278 
-0.0013 
0.0131 
0.0011 
-0.0263 
 
 
 
Tender 
0.03 
-0.0222 
0.0193 
0.0112 
-0.1441*** 
0.3560*** 
-0.2060*** 
0.1722*** 
 
 
Com
peting Bid 
-0.0209 
0.0254 
0.0007 
0.1068*** 
0.0511* 
0.0383 
-0.0564* 
0.1088*** 
0.1309*** 
 
D
iversification 
-0.0119 
0.0041 
-0.0186 
0.0369 
-0.0647** 
0.1636*** 
-0.0805*** 
0.0043 
0.0405 
-0.0089 
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Table 4 – A
cquisition Prem
ium
 A
nalysis and R
eference Point 
Table 4 com
pares the im
pact of social connections and reference point hypothesis on acquisition prem
ium
s. D
epending on the degree of our calculated 52-w
eek high 
variables, w
e divide our sam
ple into three quantiles (low
, m
edium
, high). N
ext, w
e present the values for the full sam
ple and sub-divide our sam
ple based on the presence and 
degree of social connections. The acquisition prem
ium
 is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een offer price and the target’s share price four w
eeks before the 
deal announcem
ent. A
ccording to Baker et al. (2012), target 52-w
eek high is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een the 52-w
eek high share price and the target’s 
share price four w
eeks before the deal announcem
ent. A
 connection is present if the acquirer’s directors form
 a first- or second-degree social connection to the target’s 
directors. A
 first-degree connection, also know
n as board interlocks, is considered if a director sim
ultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the 
announcem
ent of the M
&
A
 deal. A
 second-degree connection requires a social tie betw
een tw
o directors from
 both target and acquiring firm
s at the deal announcem
ent, 
respectively. The rem
aining deals are defined as non-connected M
&
A
 transactions. Tw
o-tailed t-test is em
ployed to exam
 the difference of prem
ium
 betw
een pair-w
ise 
groups. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
  
Full Sam
ple 
Connected 
deals 
First-degree 
connected 
Second-degree 
connected 
N
on-connected 
deals 
D
ifference 
Prem
ium
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(2) - (5) 
(3) - (5) 
(4) - (5) 
(3) - (4) 
52-W
eek 
high 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
Low
 
0.3016 
0.2766 
0.1540 
0.3061 
0.3060 
-0.0294 
-0.1520*** 
0.0001 
-0.1521** 
M
edium
 
0.3519 
0.2890 
0.2580 
0.3031 
0.3629 
-0.0739** 
-0.1049*** 
-0.0598 
-0.0451* 
H
igh 
0.5149 
0.4249 
0.3685 
0.4644 
0.5310 
-0.1061** 
-0.1625*** 
-0.0666 
-0.0959* 
　
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
bservations 
1502 
228 
66 
198 
1243 
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Table 5 – Determinants of the acquisition premium 
 
Table 5 reports the multivariate analysis for acquisition premium. In all models, acquisition premium is 
regressed against a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirer and target firm are socially 
connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference between offer price 
and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. Further, we differentiate 
between first- and second-degree connections. The independent variable in Model 1 and Model 4 is 
Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The independent 
variable in Model 3 is target 52-week high, log percentage difference of the target’s 52-week high 
share price to evaluate the anchoring effect. The independent variables in Model 2 and Model 5 are 
first-degree connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection happens if a director 
simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A 
second-degree connection requires a social tie between a director from the acquirer’s board and a 
director from the target’s board. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for 
instance employment, education or social clubs. Furthermore, we use the log percentage difference of 
the target’s 52-week high share price from Baker et al. (2012) in Model 4 and Model 5. In addition, we 
control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we control for 
industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and year 
dummies. All models contain the same control variables that are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
      
Connection -0.2724***   -0.2691***  
 (-2.67) 
  (-2.64)  
First-degree connection  -0.4072***   -0.4045*** 
 
 (-2.72)   (-2.64) 
Second-degree connection   0.0213   0.0227 
 
 (0.29)   (0.29) 
target 52-week high    0.0386*** 0.0145 0.0212 
 
  (3.19) (1.01) (1.30) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 (-0.29) (0.58) (-0.28) (-0.30) (-0.06) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0044 -0.0035*** -0.0033 -0.0043 -0.0034** 
 (-1.39) (-2.64) (-1.24) (-1.36) (-2.45) 
Relative deal size  -0.1659* -0.1386** -0.1564** -0.1663* -0.1516** 
 (-1.91) (-2.25) (-2.50) (-1.92) (-2.38) 
Pure Cash deal  0.0683 0.1495** 0.1280** 0.0757 0.1551** 
 (0.86) (2.42) (2.00) (0.94) (2.48) 
Hostile takeover -0.7180 0.4038 0.4475* -0.7059 0.4285 
 (-1.41) (1.43) (1.69) (-1.37) (1.63) 
Tender Offer  -0.0060 0.0734 0.0976 -0.0027 0.0661 
 (-0.06) (1.03) (1.24) (-0.03) (0.90) 
Competing bid 0.0160 0.1297 0.1037 0.0113 0.1136 
 (0.10) (0.99) (0.85) (0.07) (0.85) 
Diversification -0.0355 -0.0204 -0.0291 -0.0327 -0.0152 
 (-0.48) (-0.36) (-0.48) (-0.44) (-0.26) 
45 
Constant -0.8775*** -1.0568*** -1.2695*** -0.9091*** -1.0876*** 
 (-3.86) (-10.40) (-8.95) (-3.96) (-10.23) 
 
  
 
  
Year-fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.089 0.068 0.085 0.087 
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Table 6 – Acquisition premium analysis in subsamples of low/high target 52-week high 
Table 6 reports the multivariate analysis for acquisition premium in subsamples of low/high target 52-
week high. Target 52-week high is the target's 52-week high share price, computed as log percentage 
difference of the target’s share price four weeks before the M&A deal announcement. The full sample 
is split into three groups based on the target 52-week high. The low group in Model 1 and Model 3 
refers to the subsample in which the deals have the lowest target 52-week high, while the high group in 
Model 2 and Model 4 is the subsample in which the deals have the highest target 52-week high. In all 
models, acquisition premium is regressed against a dummy variable indicating if the acquirer and target 
firm are socially connected. The acquisition premium is computed as the log percentage difference 
between offer price and the target’s share price four weeks before the deal announcement. Further, we 
differentiate between first- and second-degree connections. The independent variable in Model 1 and 
Model 2 is Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are socially connected with targets. The 
dependent variables in Model 3 and Model 4 are first-degree connection and second-degree connection. 
A first-degree connection happens if a director simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s 
boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A second-degree connection requires a social tie 
between a director from the acquirer’s board and a director from the target’s board. This connection 
may be formed through any historical path, for instance employment, education or social clubs. In 
addition, we control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all models, we 
control for industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and 
year dummies. All models contain the same control variables that are defined in Appendix A. Robust t-
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Low  High  Low  High  Acquisition premium 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 　    
Connection 0.0521 -0.1958**   
 (0.50) (-2.14) 
  
First-degree connection   -0.5089 -0.3937*** 
 
  (-1.36) (-3.31) 
Second-degree connection    0.1676 -0.0594 
 
  (1.55) (-0.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  0.0064 -0.0016* 0.0056 -0.0017* 
 (1.03) (-1.74) (0.91) (-1.85) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0013 -0.0058*** -0.0013 -0.0053*** 
 (-1.03) (-2.85) (-1.05) (-2.67) 
Relative deal size  -0.1918** -0.0864 -0.2062** -0.0992 
 (-2.13) (-0.95) (-2.30) (-1.12) 
Pure Cash deal  0.1178 0.1493* 0.1338 0.1523* 
 (1.14) (1.79) (1.34) (1.84) 
Hostile takeover 0.5269 0.3415* 0.5358 0.3542* 
 (1.43) (1.74) (1.49) (1.78) 
Tender Offer -0.0566 0.1132 -0.0684 0.1148 
 (-0.46) (1.25) (-0.57) (1.26) 
Competing bid 0.2631 -0.0490 0.2967* -0.0563 
 (1.53) (-0.26) (1.71) (-0.30) 
Diversification -0.0210 -0.0601 -0.0227 -0.0634 
 (-0.24) (-0.76) (-0.26) (-0.80) 
Constant -0.8192*** -0.5186** -0.8404*** -0.5242*** 
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 (-3.58) (-2.49) (-3.68) (-2.59) 
 　    
Year-fixed-effects yes yes yes yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  yes yes yes yes 
Observations 751 751 751 751 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.075 0.067 0.078 
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Table 7 – Explain low
 prem
ium
 for connected deals 
 Table 7 explores the reason w
hy acquisition prem
ium
 is associated w
ith social connection w
ith 3 panels.  Panel A
 show
s univariate analysis for low
 prem
ium
 in the 
connected deals, first-degree connected deals and second-degree connected deals, w
hich are further classified by director’s position in board of acquisition partner. W
e divide 
the board position into first-level (CEO
; Chairm
an) and second-level (com
m
on director; independent director). A
_higher position refers to interlocking directors have higher 
position in acquirer board than in target board. A
_sam
e level position is defined that interlocking director is CEO
/ Chairm
an of acquirer and target or is hired as com
m
on 
director or independent director of acquisition partners. T_higher position indicates that interlocking director has higher position (CEO
/Chairm
an) in acquirer than in target. 
Panel B lim
its the sam
ple to second-degree connected deals. In Panel B, w
e classify the sam
ple by w
hether target director is retained in the board of com
bined firm
 after 
acquisition. Panel C lists m
ultivariate analysis for low
 prem
ium
. M
odel 1 and M
odel 2 report regressions for deals w
ith connection. M
odel 3 and M
odel 4 show
s the results of 
first-degree connection. The dependent variables in all the m
odels are acquisition prem
ium
, com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een offer price and the target’s 
share price four w
eeks before the deal announcem
ent. A
_higher position is a dum
m
y variable w
hich equals one w
hen interlocking director have a higher board position in 
acquirer than in target, zero otherw
ise. A
_sam
e position is a dum
m
y variable w
hich equals one w
hen interlocking director has sam
e level position in acquirer as in target, 
zero otherw
ise. In M
odel 5 and M
odel 6, the independent variable is T_retain, a dum
m
y variable w
hich equals one w
hen target director is offered a board seat in board of 
com
bined firm
. M
odels 2, M
odel 4 and M
odel 6 control both year and industry fixed-effects. For brevity, w
e do not report the results for the industry and year dum
m
ies. A
ll 
m
odels contain the sam
e control variables that are defined in A
ppendix A
. Tw
o-tailed t-test is em
ployed to exam
 the difference of prem
ium
 betw
een pair-w
ise groups in 
Panel A
 and Panel B. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A
: U
nivariate A
nalysis of Prem
ium
 for seniority 
　
 
Connected deal  
A
_higher position 
A
_T sam
e level  
T_higher position 
D
ifference 
　
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(2) - (4) 
(3) - (4) 
(2) - (3) 
prem
ium
  
0.3368 
0.2788 
0.3478 
0.3936 
-0.1148** 
-0.0458* 
-0.0690 
O
bservations 
228 
34 
142 
52 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
First-degree connected 
A
_higher position 
A
_T sam
e level  
T_higher position 
D
ifference 
　
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(2) - (4) 
(3) - (4) 
(2) - (3) 
prem
ium
  
0.2888 
0.1317 
0.2820 
0.4694 
-0.1906*** 
-0.0618** 
-0.1504** 
O
bservations 
66 
22 
32 
12 
　
 
　
 
　
 
　
 
Second-degree connected 
A
_higher position 
A
_T sam
e level  
T_higher position 
D
ifference 
　
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(2) - (4) 
(3) - (4) 
(2) - (3) 
prem
ium
  
0.3564 
0.2936 
0.3729 
0.3591 
-0.0654 
-0.0139 
-0.0654 
O
bservations 
162 
12 
110 
40 
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Panel B: Univariate analysis of Premium for retention  
　 Connected deal Retain Non-retain Difference 
　 (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
premium  0.3368 0.3012 0.4007 -0.0995*** 
Observations 228 120 108 　 
　 Second-degree connected Retain Non-retain Difference 
　 (1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) 
premium  0.3564 0.3146 0.3773 -0.0626** 
Observations 162 54 108 　 
 
 
Panel C: Multivariate analysis of Premium for seniority and retention 
Connected  First-degree Connected Connected  
Acquisition Premium Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
A_higher position -0.1674*** -0.1678*** -0.3060*** -0.4775***   
 (-3.29) (-2.97) (-3.68) (-3.74)   
A_T same level position -0.0528* -0.0508 -0.1233* -0.3695***   
 (-1.67) (-1.61) (-1.77) (-3.22)   
T_Retain     -0.1040*** -0.0959*** 
     (-3.38) (-2.99) 
target 52-week high  0.0185*** 0.0114 0.0246 0.0003 0.0180*** 0.0106 
 (2.65) (1.61) (0.63) (0.00) (2.58) (1.50) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q  -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0132 0.0500** -0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.32) (-0.20) (1.51) (2.89) (-0.00) (0.01) 
Target Tobin's Q  -0.0021** -0.0026*** 0.0006 -0.0235** -0.0024** -0.0029*** 
 (-2.04) (-2.66) (0.09) (-2.24) (-2.29) (-3.03) 
Relative deal size  -0.0530*** -0.0608*** -0.3180*** -0.4711** -0.0517** -0.0608*** 
 (-2.66) (-2.77) (-3.01) (-2.95) (-2.41) (-2.60) 
Pure Cash deal  0.0853*** 0.0729*** -0.1019* -0.1426 0.0845*** 0.0743*** 
 (3.79) (2.98) (-1.74) (-1.75) (3.72) (3.04) 
Hostile takeover 0.0330 0.0393 0.1756 0.1928 0.0439 0.0474 
 (0.31) (0.36) (1.03) (0.77) (0.42) (0.44) 
Tender Offer  0.1096*** 0.0517 0.2555*** 0.1872* 0.1035*** 0.0448 
 (3.46) (1.63) (3.62) (1.95) (3.29) (1.42) 
Competing bid 0.1237** 0.1271** 0.1810 0.3978** 0.1237** 0.1264** 
 (2.24) (2.23) (1.67) (2.46) (2.24) (2.22) 
Diversification -0.0238 -0.0198 -0.1044* -0.0783 -0.0242 -0.0218 
 (-1.12) (-0.91) (-1.85) (-1.05) (-1.13) (-1.00) 
Constant 0.3666*** 0.5532*** 0.4198*** 0.0355 0.3671*** 0.5570*** 
 (20.63) (7.80) (5.49) (0.12) (20.26) (7.94) 
       
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 228 228 66 66 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.080 0.120 0.361 0.466 0.080 0.123 
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Table 8 - D
eterm
inants of acquisition prem
ium
 in C
EO
 connections 
 In Table 8, w
e analyse the acquisition prem
ium
 by adopting an alternative proxy – CEO
 connection. In all m
odels, acquisition prem
ium
 is regressed against a dum
m
y 
variable indicating if the acquirer and target firm
 are socially connected. The acquisition prem
ium
 is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een the offer price and 
the target’s share price four w
eeks before the deal announcem
ent. The independent variable in M
odel 1, M
odel 2 and M
odel 5 is CEO
 Connection, w
hich is equal to one if 
either acquirer or targets CEO
 connects the tw
o m
erging firm
s. The dependent variables in M
odel 3, M
odel 4 and M
odel 6 are CEO
 first-degree connection and CEO
 second-
degree connection. CEO
 connection refers to the situation that CEO
 first-degree connection is defined as w
hen acquirer CEO
s also w
ork as a target board m
em
ber (acquirer 
board m
em
ber) or executive. CEO
 second-degree connection happens w
hen acquirer or target CEO
s share past experience w
ith board m
em
bers or executives in the 
counterpart firm
. Furtherm
ore, w
e use the log percentage difference of the target’s 52-w
eek high share price from
 Baker et al. (2012) in M
odel 2 and M
odel 4. In addition, w
e 
control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all m
odels, w
e control for industry and year fixed effects. In M
odel 5 and M
odel 6, w
e split the full 
sam
ple into three groups (low
, m
edium
, high) based on the target 52-w
eek high and show
 the m
ultivariate analysis of prem
ium
s in the low
/high target 52-w
eek high 
subsam
ple. For brevity, w
e do not report the results for the industry and year dum
m
ies. A
ll m
odels contain the sam
e control variables that are defined in A
ppendix A
. Robust 
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
  
M
odel 5 
M
odel 6 
A
cquisition Prem
ium
 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
Low
 
H
igh 
Low
 
H
igh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEO
 Connection 
-0.2891** 
-0.3117** 
 
 
-0.1400 
-0.4563*** 
 
 
 
(-2.50) 
(-2.56) 
 
 
(-0.59) 
(-3.66) 
 
 
First-degree CEO
 connection 
 
 
-0.5075** 
-0.5704*** 
 
 
-0.8295 
-0.5370*** 
 
 
 
(-2.39) 
(-2.60) 
 
 
(-1.64) 
(-3.26) 
Second-degree CEO
 connection  
 
 
-0.1266 
-0.1317 
 
 
0.2476 
-0.3992** 
 
 
 
(-1.10) 
(-1.11) 
 
 
(1.48) 
(-2.24) 
target 52-w
eek high  
 
0.0197 
 
0.0210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.22) 
 
(1.29) 
 
 
 
 
A
cquirer Tobin's Q
  
0.0004 
-0.0003 
0.0005 
-0.0001 
0.0057 
-0.0017* 
0.0071 
-0.0017* 
 
(0.40) 
(-0.33) 
(0.45) 
(-0.07) 
(0.93) 
(-1.94) 
(1.15) 
(-1.91) 
Target Tobin's Q
  
-0.0037*** 
-0.0035** 
-0.0036*** 
-0.0034** 
-0.0012 
-0.0051*** 
-0.0012 
-0.0051*** 
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(-2.67) 
(-2.47) 
(-2.68) 
(-2.42) 
(-0.99) 
(-2.65) 
(-0.97) 
(-2.62) 
Relative deal size  
-0.1463** 
-0.1580** 
-0.1489** 
-0.1514** 
-0.1925** 
-0.0940 
-0.1912** 
-0.0930 
 
(-2.32) 
(-2.44) 
(-2.35) 
(-2.38) 
(-2.13) 
(-1.15) 
(-2.10) 
(-1.10) 
Pure Cash deal  
0.1326** 
0.1369** 
0.1329** 
0.1519** 
0.1120 
0.1541* 
0.1334 
0.1640** 
 
(2.15) 
(2.19) 
(2.16) 
(2.44) 
(1.08) 
(1.91) 
(1.35) 
(2.01) 
H
ostile takeover 
0.4067** 
0.4309** 
0.3906** 
0.3999** 
0.5213 
0.3549* 
0.4721 
0.3274* 
 
(2.26) 
(2.45) 
(2.18) 
(2.52) 
(1.29) 
(1.80) 
(1.34) 
(1.67) 
Tender O
ffer  
0.0528 
0.0466 
0.0577 
0.0686 
-0.0675 
0.1173 
-0.0263 
0.1317 
 
(0.75) 
(0.63) 
(0.81) 
(0.94) 
(-0.57) 
(1.24) 
(-0.22) 
(1.45) 
Com
peting bid 
0.1162 
0.0997 
0.1206 
0.1162 
0.2703 
-0.0464 
0.3573** 
-0.0632 
 
(0.89) 
(0.75) 
(0.92) 
(0.87) 
(1.57) 
(-0.25) 
(1.98) 
(-0.34) 
D
iversification 
-0.0182 
-0.0152 
-0.0185 
-0.0151 
-0.0210 
-0.0591 
-0.0180 
-0.0635 
 
(-0.29) 
(-0.23) 
(-0.29) 
(-0.26) 
(-0.23) 
(-0.70) 
(-0.21) 
(-0.80) 
Constant 
-0.6736*** 
-0.7101*** 
-0.6793*** 
-1.0902*** 
-0.8130*** 
-0.5437*** 
-1.1661*** 
-0.9619*** 
 
(-4.54) 
(-4.62) 
(-4.58) 
(-10.30) 
(-3.45) 
(-2.71) 
(-7.18) 
(-6.84) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
ear-fixed-effects 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Industry-fixed-effects  
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
bservations 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
751 
751 
751 
751 
A
djusted R2 
0.093 
0.092 
0.095 
0.090 
0.055 
0.086 
0.072 
0.080 
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Table 9 - Method of Payment 
Table 9 reports the logit regression on the method of payment. The dependent variable in all models is 
the Stock dummy, which is equal to one if the takeover transaction is fully financed with stock. The 
independent variable in Model 1 and Model 2 is Connection, which is equal to one if acquirers are 
socially connected with targets. The dependent variable in Model 3 and Model 4 is first-degree 
connection and second-degree connection. A first-degree connection happens if a director 
simultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s boards at the announcement of the M&A deal. A 
second-degree connection requires a social tie between a director from the acquirer’s board and a 
director from the target’s board. This connection may be formed through any historical path, for 
instance employment, education or social clubs. Further, we control for different acquirer and deal-
related characteristics, as well as for industry and year fixed effects in Model 2 and Model 4. For 
brevity, we do not report the results for the industry and year dummies. All models contain the same 
control variables that are defined in Appendix A.  ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Stock as payment method Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Connection 0.6800*** 0.7955***   
 (3.55) (3.90)   
First-degree connection   0.8667*** 0.8662*** 
   (2.79) (2.77) 
Second-degree connection    0.5829** 0.7159*** 
   (2.50) (2.87) 
target 52-week high  0.0900* 0.1160* 0.0894* 0.1047* 
 (1.71) (1.82) (1.71) (1.69) 
Acquirer stock Run-up 0.5428*** 0.5018*** 0.5371*** 0.4179** 
 (2.88) (2.61) (2.82) (2.13) 
Acquirer firm size -0.2479*** -0.2103*** -0.2449*** -0.2100*** 
 (-5.76) (-4.57) (-5.70) (-4.56) 
Relative deal size  -0.0674 0.0291 -0.0565 -0.0038 
 (-0.49) (0.20) (-0.41) (-0.02) 
Hostile takeover 0.4920 0.3960 0.4766 0.3295 
 (0.57) (0.47) (0.56) (0.39) 
Tender Offer  -1.7878*** -1.5877*** -1.7903*** -1.6023*** 
 (-5.84) (-5.18) (-5.84) (-5.25) 
Competing bid -0.4711 -0.4259 -0.4800 -0.4758 
 (-1.10) (-0.97) (-1.12) (-1.10) 
Diversification -0.2404 -0.1664 -0.2423 -0.1235 
 (-1.47) (-0.99) (-1.48) (-0.73) 
Constant 0.8776** -0.1185 0.8538** 0.0301 
 (2.47) (-0.12) (2.40) (0.03) 
     
Year-fixed-effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1502 1502 1502 1502 
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.136 0.107 0.142 
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Table 10 –Endogeneity test 
 Table 10 reports the endogeneity test – tw
o stages least square (2sls) – for acquisition prem
ium
 analysis. The instrum
ent variable for social connection is previous social 
connection, w
hich refers to a situation w
here acquirers and targets are socially connected three years before the takeover announcem
ent. Sim
ilarly, the instrum
ent variable for 
first-degree connection is previous first-degree connection, w
hich describes w
hether a director sim
ultaneously served on the acquirer’s and target’s boards three years before 
the announcem
ent of the M
&
A
 deal. The instrum
ent variable for second-degree connection is previous second-degree connection, w
hich describes w
hether tw
o individual 
board m
em
bers, respectively from
 the acquirer and target, had social ties three years before the deal announcem
ent. This connection m
ay be form
ed through any historical 
path, for instance em
ploym
ent, education or social clubs. In all m
odels, acquisition prem
ium
 is regressed against a dum
m
y variable indicating if the acquirer and target firm
s 
are socially connected. The acquisition prem
ium
 is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een offer price and the target’s share price four w
eeks before the deal 
announcem
ent. Furtherm
ore, w
e use the percentage difference of the target’s 52-w
eek high share price from
 Baker et al. (2012) as a m
easure of potential overpaym
ent. In 
addition, w
e control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics. In all m
odels, w
e control for industry and year fixed effects. For brevity, w
e do not report 
the results for the industry and year dum
m
ies. A
ll m
odels contain the sam
e control variables that are defined in A
ppendix A
. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, 
** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
 
M
odel 1  
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
First-stage: 
First-stage: 
First-stage: 
First-stage: 
A
cquisition Prem
ium
 
Connection 
Second-stage 
Connection 
Second-stage 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
Second-stage 
First-degree 
Connection 
Second-degree 
Connection 
Second-stage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Connection  
 
-0.1648* 
 
-0.1693* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-1.72) 
 
(-1.79) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First-degree connection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.4502** 
 
 
-0.4525** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-2.14) 
 
 
(-2.42) 
Second-degree connection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.0268 
 
 
-0.0222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(-0.27) 
 
 
(-0.20) 
Target 52-w
eek high  
 
 
-0.0019 
0.0192 
 
 
 
0.0002 
-0.0033** 
0.0203 
 
 
 
(-1.36) 
(1.12) 
 
 
 
(0.31) 
(-2.44) 
(1.21) 
A
cquirer Tobin's Q
  
-0.0001 
0.0006 
-0.0003* 
-0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0000 
0.0005 
0.0001 
0.0000 
-0.0002 
 
(-0.26) 
(0.43) 
(-1.68) 
(-0.07) 
(0.92) 
(-0.07) 
(0.28) 
(0.85) 
(-0.22) 
(-0.06) 
Target Tobin's Q
  
0.0000 
-0.0038 
0.0000 
-0.0036 
0.0001 
-0.0004 
-0.0035* 
0.0001 
-0.0004 
-0.0034* 
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(0.20) 
(-1.36) 
(0.09) 
(-1.29) 
(0.68) 
(-0.94) 
(-1.92) 
(0.65) 
(-0.95) 
(-1.72) 
Relative deal size  
0.0373 
-0.1406* 
0.0215 
-0.1510** 
-0.0052 
0.0441* 
-0.1486* 
-0.0066 
0.0449* 
-0.1615*** 
 
(1.41) 
(-1.82) 
(1.04) 
(-2.12) 
(-0.85) 
(1.69) 
(-1.85) 
(-1.05) 
(1.74) 
(-2.83) 
Pure Cash deal  
-0.0133 
0.1273** 
-0.0183 
0.1313** 
-0.0115 
-0.0049 
0.1324** 
-0.0122 
-0.0063 
0.1378** 
 
(-0.80) 
(2.22) 
(-0.97) 
(2.30) 
(-1.46) 
(-0.29) 
(2.12) 
(-1.49) 
(-0.37) 
(2.28) 
H
ostile takeover 
0.0372 
0.3982** 
0.0276 
0.4204** 
0.0622 
-0.0269 
0.4196** 
0.0624 
-0.0338 
0.4439** 
 
(0.37) 
(2.21) 
(0.24) 
(2.51) 
(0.66) 
(-0.85) 
(2.12) 
(0.65) 
(-1.03) 
(2.54) 
Tender O
ffer  
0.0200 
0.0611 
0.0290 
0.0550 
0.0089 
0.0146 
0.0595 
0.0091 
0.0246 
0.0522 
 
(0.84) 
(0.86) 
(1.01) 
(0.93) 
(0.60) 
(0.57) 
(0.85) 
(0.60) 
(0.95) 
(0.82) 
Com
peting bid 
-0.0185 
0.1131 
-0.0327 
0.0972 
0.0187 
-0.0327 
0.1186 
0.0177 
-0.0321 
0.1024 
 
(-0.70) 
(0.92) 
(-1.09) 
(0.76) 
(0.73) 
(-1.21) 
(0.89) 
(0.68) 
(-1.17) 
(0.86) 
D
iversification 
0.0145 
-0.0199 
0.0152 
-0.0153 
0.0094 
-0.0008 
-0.0219 
0.0098 
0.0007 
-0.0167 
 
(0.87) 
(-0.49) 
(0.83) 
(-0.28) 
(1.05) 
(-0.05) 
(-0.34) 
(1.04) 
(0.04) 
(-0.36) 
Previous Connection (IV
) 
0.9319*** 
 
0.9329*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(77.07) 
 
(62.50) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Previous First-degree connection (IV
) 
 
 
 
0.9662*** 
-0.4137*** 
 
0.9625*** 
-0.4179*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(77.82) 
(-5.66) 
 
(68.76) 
(-5.58) 
 
Previous Second-degree connection (IV
) 
 
 
 
0.0401 
0.8052*** 
 
0.0438 
0.7959*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.61) 
 
 
(1.61) 
(24.07) 
 
Constant 
-0.0345 
-0.6653*** 
-0.0022 
-0.7011*** 
-0.0138 
-0.0149 
-0.6749*** 
-0.0001 
0.0059 
-0.7133*** 
 
(-1.48) 
(-5.11) 
(-0.1) 
(-4.62) 
(-1.17) 
(-0.57) 
(-5.45) 
(-0.01) 
(0.29) 
(-4.48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
ear-fixed-effects 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Industry-fixed-effects  
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
bservations 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
1502 
A
djusted R2 
0.655 
0.087 
0.6289 
0.085 
0.6433 
0.5545 
0.094 
0.6354 
0.5438 
0.092 
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Table 11 – A
lternative target reference points 
Table 11 reports the prem
ium
 analysis w
ith social connection and alternative target reference points. In Panel A
, the acquisition prem
ium
 is regressed against a dum
m
y 
variable indicating if the acquirer and target firm
s are socially connected. The independent variable in M
odel 1, M
odel 2, M
odel 3 and M
odel 4 is first-degree connection. 
Furtherm
ore, w
e use the log percentage difference of the target’s X
-w
eek high share price from
 Baker et al. (2012) in all m
odels. Panel B show
s the m
ultivariate regressions 
in the subsam
ple of low
/high target reference point. Target’s X
-w
eek high is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een target peak price achieved during the past X
 
w
eeks and target price 4 w
eeks before the deal announcem
ent. The m
odels include target 13-w
eek high, target 26-w
eek high, target 39-w
eek high and target 104-w
eek high 
as target reference point in M
odel 1, M
odel 2, M
odel 3 and M
odel 4, respectively. The acquisition prem
ium
 is com
puted as the log percentage difference betw
een offer price 
and the target’s share price four w
eeks before the deal announcem
ent. A
 first-degree connection happens if a director sim
ultaneously serves on the acquirer’s and target’s 
boards at the announcem
ent of the M
&
A
 deal. In addition, w
e control for different acquirer, target and deal-related characteristics, as w
ell as for industry and year fixed 
effects. A
ll m
odels contain the sam
e control variables that are defined in A
ppendix A
. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%
, 5%
 and 10%
 levels, respectively. 
  Prem
ium
 analysis in the subsam
ples of low
/high target reference points 
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
13-w
eek high reference point 
26-w
eek high reference point 
39-w
eek high reference point 
104-w
eek high reference point 
A
cquisition Prem
ium
 
Low
  
H
igh  
Low
  
H
igh  
Low
  
H
igh  
Low
  
H
igh  
First-degree connection 
-0.5089 
-0.3937*** 
-0.5089 
-0.3937*** 
-0.5089 
-0.3937*** 
-0.5089 
-0.3937*** 
 
(-1.36) 
(-3.31) 
(-1.36) 
(-3.31) 
(-1.36) 
(-3.31) 
(-1.36) 
(-3.31) 
Second-degree connection  
0.1676 
-0.0594 
0.1676 
-0.0594 
0.1676 
-0.0594 
0.1676 
-0.0594 
 
(1.55) 
(-0.50) 
(1.55) 
(-0.50) 
(1.55) 
(-0.50) 
(1.55) 
(-0.50) 
A
cquirer Tobin's Q
  
0.0056 
-0.0017* 
0.0056 
-0.0017* 
0.0056 
-0.0017* 
0.0056 
-0.0017* 
 
(0.91) 
(-1.85) 
(0.91) 
(-1.85) 
(0.91) 
(-1.85) 
(0.91) 
(-1.85) 
Target Tobin's Q
  
-0.0013 
-0.0053*** 
-0.0013 
-0.0053*** 
-0.0013 
-0.0053*** 
-0.0013 
-0.0053*** 
 
(-1.05) 
(-2.67) 
(-1.05) 
(-2.67) 
(-1.05) 
(-2.67) 
(-1.05) 
(-2.67) 
Relative deal size  
-0.2062** 
-0.0992 
-0.2062** 
-0.0992 
-0.2062** 
-0.0992 
-0.2062** 
-0.0992 
 
(-2.30) 
(-1.12) 
(-2.30) 
(-1.12) 
(-2.30) 
(-1.12) 
(-2.30) 
(-1.12) 
Pure stock deal  
0.1338 
0.1523* 
0.1338 
0.1523* 
0.1338 
0.1523* 
0.1338 
0.1523* 
 
(1.34) 
(1.84) 
(1.34) 
(1.84) 
(1.34) 
(1.84) 
(1.34) 
(1.84) 
H
ostile takeover 
0.5358 
0.3542* 
0.5358 
0.3542* 
0.5358 
0.3542* 
0.5358 
0.3542* 
 
(1.49) 
(1.78) 
(1.49) 
(1.78) 
(1.49) 
(1.78) 
(1.49) 
(1.78) 
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Tender O
ffer 
-0.0684 
0.1148 
-0.0684 
0.1148 
-0.0684 
0.1148 
-0.0684 
0.1148 
 
(-0.57) 
(1.26) 
(-0.57) 
(1.26) 
(-0.57) 
(1.26) 
(-0.57) 
(1.26) 
Com
peting bid 
0.2967* 
-0.0563 
0.2967* 
-0.0563 
0.2967* 
-0.0563 
0.2967* 
-0.0563 
 
(1.71) 
(-0.30) 
(1.71) 
(-0.30) 
(1.71) 
(-0.30) 
(1.71) 
(-0.30) 
D
iversification 
-0.0227 
-0.0634 
-0.0227 
-0.0634 
-0.0227 
-0.0634 
-0.0227 
-0.0634 
 
(-0.26) 
(-0.80) 
(-0.26) 
(-0.80) 
(-0.26) 
(-0.80) 
(-0.26) 
(-0.80) 
Constant 
-0.8404*** 
-0.5242*** 
-0.8404*** 
-0.5242*** 
-0.8404*** 
-0.5242*** 
-0.8404*** 
-0.5242*** 
 
(-3.68) 
(-2.59) 
(-3.68) 
(-2.59) 
(-3.68) 
(-2.59) 
(-3.68) 
(-2.59) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y
ear-fixed-effects 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Industry-fixed-effects  
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
O
bservations 
751 
751 
751 
751 
751 
751 
751 
751 
A
djusted R2 
0.067 
0.078 
0.067 
0.078 
0.067 
0.078 
0.067 
0.078 
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Table 12 – Propensity Score Matching  
 
Table 12 presents propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to estimate the social connection effect in 
premium. Bootstrap is applied to estimate the standard error and confidence interval. The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) compares the outcome between treated group and un-treated group in the matched 
sample. Nearest neighbor matching (NN) is adopted as matching algorithm to compute ATT. In Panel 1a and 
Panel 1b, the treatment group is the deals in which acquirers and targets are socially connected. The control 
group in Panel 1a is matched non-connected deals with similar baseline characteristics (excluding target 52-
week high reference point). The control group in Panel 1b is matched non-connected deals with similar 
baseline characteristics (including target 52-week high reference point). Similarly, the treatment group in 
Panel 2a and Panel 2b is first-degree connected deals while the control group is matched non-connected deals 
with same firm and deal characteristic (excluding target 52-week high reference point in the characteristics of 
control group in Panel 2a; including target 52-week high reference point in Panel 2b). Robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
Panel 1a: connection effect    
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 166 Observation 142 -20.3%* 0.121 -1.668 
       
Panel 1b: connection effect (target 52-week high in matching sample) 
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 153 Observation 135 -13.00% 0.100 -1.309 
       
Panel 2a: first-degree connection effect   
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 48 Observation 46 -15.3%*** 0.065 -3.142 
Panel 2b: first-degree connection effect (target 52-week high in matching sample) 
Treatment group  Control group  ATT Standard Error t-value 
Observation 47 Observation 43 -25.3%*** 0.073 -3.447 
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A
ppendix A
 
 
　
 
　
 
V
ariables  
D
efinitions  
Source  
Panel A
: D
ependent V
ariables  
A
cquisition prem
ium
 
Prem
ium
 is defined as the offer price, as the log percentage difference from
 target's share price four 
w
eeks before the M
&
A
 deal announcem
ent (Baker et al., 2012).  
CRSP/SD
C  
Panel B: K
ey independent variables  
 connection  
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if acquirer and target share at least one 1st-degree or 2nd-degree 
connection. 
BoardEx 
1st-degree connection  
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if a director (including CEO
) serves on the acquirer’s and target's boards 
at the deal announcem
ent. 
BoardEx 
2nd-degree connection 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if a social tie betw
een the respective CEO
s or directors of m
erging 
com
panies is present at the deal announcem
ent.  
BoardEx 
CEO
 connection  
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if either acquirer or target CEO
 connects the tw
o m
erging firm
s.  
BoardEx 
CEO
 first-degree connection  
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if acquirer CEO
 (target CEO
) also serves as a target board m
em
ber 
(acquirer board m
em
ber) or m
anagem
ent. 
BoardEx 
CEO
 second-degree connection 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if acquirer or target CEO
 shares the sam
e past experience w
ith board 
m
em
bers or executives in the counterpart firm
.  
BoardEx 
Board connection 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if board m
em
bers connect the bidders w
ith targets. 
BoardEx 
Board first-degree connection 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if bidding firm
s and targets share the sam
e board m
em
ber.  
BoardEx 
Board second-degree connection 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if tw
o individuals respectively from
 acquirer and target boards have 
social ties through past experience. 
BoardEx 
H
igher level positions for A
cquirer (Target) 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if interlocking director holds a m
ore im
portant position in the acquirer 
(target) than in the target (acquirer) respectively w
hile the sam
e level position indicates that directors 
serve as the sam
e level position in both acquisition partners 
BoardEx 
T_retain 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if target director is offered a board seat in com
bined firm
 after 
acquisition.  
BoardEx 
Panel C: Firm
 characteristics  
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Tobin's Q
 (Q
) 
In line w
ith M
asulis et al. (2007), w
e specify Tobin's Q
 as the ratio of m
arket value by book value of 
the com
pany's assets. 
CO
M
PU
STA
T  
M
arket V
alue (M
V
) 
The m
arket value represents the size of the com
pany. It is calculated as the num
ber of shares 
outstanding m
ultiplied by the respective stock price at four w
eeks before the official deal 
announcem
ent.  
CRSP  
Leverage 
The ratio of total debt by total assets. 
CO
M
PU
STA
T 
Return on A
ssets (RO
A
) 
W
e specify RO
A
 as the ratio of the com
pany's net incom
e by the book value of total assets. 
CO
M
PU
STA
T 
Panel D
: D
eal characteristics  
Transaction value ($m
illions)  
This variable accounts for the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer in order to obtain the 
target. W
e report the total dollar value as reported by SD
C. 
SD
C 
Relative deal size  
This variable w
as com
puted as the transaction value divided by the m
arket capitalization of the 
acquirer, four w
eeks before the official deal announcem
ent.  
SD
C 
H
ostile takeover 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if the M
&
A
 deal w
as reported as hostile. 
SD
C 
Com
peting bid 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if the M
&
A
 deal involved m
ore than one bid.  
SD
C 
Pure cash deal (Cash) 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if the M
&
A
 deal w
as paid entirely by cash. 
SD
C 
Pure stock deal (Stock) 
D
um
m
y variable that equals 1 if the M
&
A
 deal w
as paid entirely by stocks. 
SD
C 
52-w
eek high (%
)  
Follow
ing Baker et al. (2012), w
e com
pute this variable as the log percentage difference of the target's 
52-w
eek high share price over the share price four w
eeks before the M
&
A
 deal announcem
ent.  
CRSP 
X
-w
eek high (%
) 
Follow
ing Baker et al. (2012), w
e com
pute this variable as the log percentage difference of the target's 
X
-w
eek high share price over the share price four w
eeks before the M
&
A
 deal announcem
ent.  
 
Stock Price run-up 
The buy-and-holder returns of bidding firm
s over the period from
 200 trading days to tw
o m
onths 
before the announcem
ent. 
CRSP 
